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Truman, McCarthy, and McCarthyism: The Battle for the Cold 
War Consensus (172 pp.) 
This essay examines the political contest between 
President Harry S. Truman and Senator Joseph McCarthy (WS.), 
a contest which began with McCarthy's speech in Wheeling, 
West Virginia and ended with the presidential election of 
1952. What began as a dispute over Truman's policies 
against domestic communism soon escalated into a partisan 
war for control over the issue of anti-communism. Truman, 
who was more than willing to have a showdown with 
Republicans on the Cold War, denounced his critics as 
"McCarthyites," politicians who lied to the public and 
played upon its hysteria. 
In his reaction to McCarthy, however, Truman engineered 
his own defeat. His own extreme anti-communism and his 
extreme partisanship placed the president in a theoretical 
straightjacket. His extremism prevented him from offering a 
clear distinction between his anti-communism and that of 
McCarthy. In the absence of such a distinction, Truman 
could neither destroy McCarthy nor retain his leadership of 
the issue of Cold War anti-communism. 
Truman continued to wage a zero-sum game. He demanded 
that Congress censure McCarthy, but he refused to offer any 
concessions or admit any mistakes. He demanded that 
Congress approve of his involvement in Korea, but he refused 
to allow it any direct involvement. Faced by an executive 
branch in disarray, Congress began to develop its own 
policies of anti-communism and to criticize Truman's 
handling of the war in Korea. Truman damned such 
congressional initiatives as McCarthyism. 
Without allies in Congress to help him reassure a troubled 
public, the President made several attempts to seize the 
initiative unilaterally. He sought to prove that he was the 
nation's fiercest anti-communist, and he sacrificed civil 
liberties in order to do so. The attempts were not only 
dishonorable, they reinforced the contradictions within his 
position and left him with precious few supporters. 
Director: Michael S. Mayer 
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INTRODUCTION 
President Harry S. Truman's response to the attack upon 
his domestic anti-communist record made by Senator Joseph 
McCarthy was a spectacular failure. The two-year long 
contest between these two partisans transformed the theory 
and practice of Cold War anti-communism from a winning 
campaign issue for Truman into a powerful indictment of his 
administration. The president's inability to counter 
McCarthy's charges stemmed in large measure from the 
dangerous precedents he himself had set into the theory and 
practice of domestic anti-communism. But it was Truman's 
response to McCarthy that, more than any other person or 
event, brought about the triumph of McCarthyism. 
From the beginning, the Truman White House took a 
position on the Senator from Wisconsin and his charges from 
which it could not retreat. Given McCarthy's perfidy and 
Truman's ideological commitment to the Cold War, it made 
perfect sense for the president to assert that his anti-
communism was rational and effective while his opponent's 
was pernicious and unwarranted. Confident of victory, 
Truman also continued to sell the American people his own 
apocalyptic brand of anti-communism. The debate between 
Truman and McCarthy quickly degenerated into a contest over 
who was the most effective Cold Warrior, the more extreme 
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anti-communist. Burdened by the exigencies of fate and 
confined by the responsibilities of high office, Truman was 
no match for McCarthy when it came to the game of one-
upmanship. Even as anti-communism became a national 
obsession, Truman's leadership of it weakened. 
Ignoring mounting evidence to the contrary, Truman 
assumed that Congress would be forced to censure McCarthy. 
Convinced of eventual victory, Truman made the most of it. 
The administration praised the vigilance of its anti-
communism while condemning its critics as pernicious 
political opportunists. The refusal to acknowledge the 
problems within the theory and practice of the anti-
communism—in the face of events like the conviction of 
Alger Hiss—opened the door for Congress to reassert its 
role in national policy. Truman, never one to back down, 
criticized and opposed Congressional efforts to demonstrate 
their patriotism by weighing in on matters of internal or 
external security. In response. Congress not only refused 
to denounce McCarthy, it also ignored Presidential anti-
communist initiatives in favor of its own. 
Truman's public approval rating sank to a record low, 
reflecting a widespread belief that his domestic and foreign 
anti-communist policies had failed. Truman attributed this 
sentiment to "McCarthyism" and swore to defeat it. His 
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uncompromising position had, however, already foreclosed the 
possibility of admitting his mistakes gracefully or of 
strengthening his political alliances. To beat "the 
McCarthyites," Truman had but one strategy: to redouble the 
effort against domestic communists. His attempt not only 
further diminished his credibility but also increased the 
abuse of civil liberties. Thus did Truman's presidency end 
not just in defeat, but in disgrace. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Oneupsiaanship 
Though McCarthy caused a sensation overnight, his 
outrageous tale of a communist conspiracy within the Truman 
administration had not come as a bullet from the blue sky. 
Truman understood McCarthy's claims as another in a series 
of attempts by the Republican right to gain control over the 
issues of domestic anti-communism and the Cold War. Having 
also learned that McCarthy could not prove the specifics of 
his allegations, Truman considered a showdown with McCarthy 
the perfect vehicle for silencing his opponents. The 
president willingly extrapolated McCarthy into a partisan 
contest for leadership of America's anti-communist fervor. 
In effect, Truman validated the extreme anti-communism 
McCarthy embodied, and it proved a costly mistake. As the 
anti-communist debate became more extreme, the distinctions 
between the anti-communism of Truman and that of McCarthy 
diminished. Truman failed to see that his extreme anti-
communism and partisanship were the root causes of his 
ineffectual policy; thus he watched helplessly as his 
contest with McCarthy intensified, his political position 
degenerated into a mass of contradictions, and the White 
House became isolated from both the public and Congress. 
While strident anti-communism had roots stretching back 
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decades, the parameters of the debate between McCarthy and 
Truman began to take shape soon after Truman became 
president. In 194 6, he became convinced that America had to 
prevent the extension of Soviet influence around the globe. 
Since this policy represented a fundamental departure in 
U.S. foreign policy sure to arouse great opposition, the 
proclamation of the Truman Doctrine had to be designed, as 
one of Truman's friends advised him, "to scare the hell out 
of the American people."^ So the president announced the 
Cold War in the gravest of terms. The democratic West, to 
prevent the totalitarian East from enslaving the world, had 
to combat communism across the globe. Recognizing that a 
program to guard against communists within America was a 
necessary adjunct to his foreign policy, Truman also signed 
Executive Order 9835 a few months later.^ 
Executive Order 9835 widened the parameters of internal 
security well beyond the search for individuals and groups 
undertaking acts of treason or sabotage against the United 
States. The order authorized Attorney General Tom Clark to 
generate a list of organizations considered "openly 
communistic" or sympathetic to communism. It also created a 
bureaucracy to protect the security of the government by 
investigating the loyalty of its employees. The loyalty 
program and the Attorney General's list identified 
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individuals who had the potential to commit disloyal acts. 
As one scholar put it, Truman ordered Clark and Loyalty 
Review Board Chairman Seth Richardson to take action against 
dangers which were "hypothetical and remote."^ Employees 
accused of disloyalty were entitled to a hearing but they 
did not have the right to know the identity of the 
informants against them/ Truman and Clark further enhanced 
their reputation for protecting the country from subversives 
by prosecuting the leadership of the Communist Party USA 
under the provisions of the Smith Act of 1940.^ 
All of the president's hard work, aided by events 
abroad, paid off; the issue of the Cold War heated up during 
the presidential election of 1948. During the campaign, 
while most Republicans continued to criticize Truman's 
interventionist foreign policy, a few broke with their 
Party's historic isolationism. Accepting the tenets of the 
Truman Doctrine, a few members of the conservative wing of 
the GOP criticized Truman for his failure to prevent the 
establishment of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and began 
to investigate the problem of domestic communist subversion. 
Though a portent of things to come, the criticisms and 
investigation failed to prevent the election of a president 
who had formulated both the apocalyptic interpretation of 
the East-West struggle and the nation's response to the 
7 
threat. 
Truman won an upset victory over Thomas Dewey of New 
York in large part because the tenets of the Cold War 
ideology had struck a resonant chord with Americans. The 
president pressed the attack by criticizing Republicans— 
especially conservative Republicans like Karl Mundt, Richard 
Nixon and Robert Taft—for their opposition to the Marshall 
plan and the other applications of the doctrine. Truman 
ridiculed the Republicans' investigation into the threat to 
national security poised by communists as a "red herring" 
and the Republicans who made it as isolationists.® 
After the presidential election, a number of events 
occurred that made it appear the communists were winning the 
Cold War, thereby increasing the number of Republicans 
willing to charge the State Department with treason and the 
White House with ineptitude. According to the Republican 
right, the government had abetted the Soviet Union's 
development of an atomic bomb as well as the communist 
takeover in China. For proof, they offered Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson's White Paper on China, a statement of 
policy in which the secretary had argued that Nationalist 
China could not be saved. Nixon, Mundt and others touted 
this formulation of events as the logical extrapolation of 
Truman's Cold War doctrine. The president, however. 
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considered their allegation that U.S. foreign policy had 
been guided by a communist conspiracy to be as preposterous 
as conservative Republicans representing themselves as the 
defenders of domestic security. 
Primarily concerned with deepening American's 
commitment to his interventionist foreign policy, Truman 
made no concerted effort to articulate the limits of 
communism's threat to national security. In terms of 
foreign policy, his efforts to explain that American could 
not have stopped the Chinese Revolution coexisted uneasily 
with his insistence that the future of the world depended 
upon the containment of the communist menace. Nor did he 
limit his assessment of the communist threat to internal 
security. On several occasions in 1949, Truman's White 
House Staff informed him of the difficulties involved in 
defining what constituted 'disloyalty' among government 
employees."' But Truman challenged neither the Republican 
right's interpretation of world events nor the dangerously 
broad definition of disloyalty used both by his loyalty 
program and Republicans alike. In the absence of such 
leadership, the nation remained confused and alarmed by the 
Cold War. 
Confusion and alarm grew exponentially following the 
conviction of Alger Hiss in late January of 1950. Hiss, 
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formerly of the State Department, was reviled by Republicans 
as a communist spy. The trial's extended length, high 
drama, and visible currents of class conflict coalesced into 
a seminal event. Critics of the administration were quick 
to point out that Hiss had been a member of the American 
delegation at Yalta, thereby bolstering their case that the 
government had been led astray by communists. Worse, there 
seemed to be all the hallmarks of a cover-up attempt. The 
exposure of Hiss had been engineered by Republicans while 
the administration dragged its feet. Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson had made the administration still more 
vulnerable when he had publicly refused to forsake his 
friendship with Alger Hiss. The arrest of Klaus Fuchs, a 
former scientist at Los Alamos who confessed to selling 
atomic secrets to the Soviets, occurred just two weeks after 
Hiss and just a few days before McCarthy's famous speech in 
Wheeling, West Virginia. 
Rising above the clamor of Cold War politics, the 
daring statements in McCarthy's speech put him at the 
forefront of a movement to investigate the efficacy of the 
administration's anti-communism. The assertion that he had 
a list of spies in the government, delivered at a Lincoln 
Day celebration on February 9, 1950 and repeated often 
during the next few days, would have been hard to ignore. 
10 
To make sure he picked a fight, he cabled the president on 
February 11 and released the telegram to the press. In it, 
he brazenly demanded that Truman allow Congress to inspect 
the files of the State Department loyalty board, which 
supervised investigations into the loyalty of the 
department's employees. "Failure on your part," warned the 
senator, "will label the Democratic Party the bedfellow of 
international communism."® His temerity, given recent 
events, provoked a reply from the administration and 
produced headlines in the newspapers. 
Truman's riposte, probably drafted that evening, 
revealed his confidence that McCarthy's claim of possessing 
a list of communists in government had been a rhetorical 
flourish that the senator would not dare repeat. Truman 
ridiculed him, contending that anyone who would bypass the 
proper authorities and make such a demand in public must be 
"un-American."® The president's contempt for McCarthy's 
insolence was understandable. As he saw it, a junior 
senator of dubious reputation had slandered his courageous 
leadership. Truman never sent the telegram to McCarthy. 
Perhaps he discussed the problem during his daily White 
House staff meeting before deciding that a direct 
presidential response was not appropriate; it was his 
practice to work closely with his staff to set policy and 
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then allow them to develop the specifics.^® In any event, 
the job of offering the administration's first answer to the 
accusations fell to Under Secretary of State Jack Peurifoy. 
Peurifoy expressed the administration's defiance in a 
State Department Bulletin released on February 13. His 
confidence stemmed from the errors in McCarthy's facts. 
After refuting the important points, he defended the 
integrity of his department and its loyalty program. The 
under secretary then demanded that the senator disclose his 
information to the proper authorities.^^ Picking up one of 
the president's points, Peurifoy contended that anyone who 
had the interests of the nation at heart, any "patriotic, 
loyal American" who had discovered a conspiracy, would take 
care to prevent a "witch-hunt. 
The rebuttal served only to increase the media's 
interest in McCarthy, though the Senator needed little help 
in attracting attention. In the midst of a cross-country 
speaking tour, McCarthy varied his allegations daily. The 
seriousness of his allegations kept reporters clamoring for 
the documents he held while he spoke. Surrounded at the 
Denver Airport, he rooted through his carry-on luggage 
before deciding that he had left his list of Communists in 
his other bag. The scene exceeded the bounds of credulity 
and made the front pages. 
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McCarthy's charges caught the White House Staff in 
transition. Charles Murphy became the White House Special 
Council on February 15. He and his staff assumed not only 
the task of formulating domestic policy, but of writing the 
speeches to sell it and conducting its implementation.^^ 
Thus, the White House had any number of pressing concerns. 
They nevertheless produced an initial assessment of the 
McCarthy situation. Presidential Assistant Stephen J. 
Spingarn wrote a memorandum suggesting the position Truman 
should take in his upcoming press conference. Spingarn, 
chosen to be a member of the president's domestic policy 
staff because of his expertise in matters of loyalty and 
security, had watched loyalty investigations degenerate into 
acrimony and slander since 1944.^^ His long experience with 
the difficulties inherent in deciding questions of loyalty, 
however, did not incline him to caution. Spingarn 
encouraged the president to blast McCarthy for jeopardizing 
the civil rights and professional reputations of those 
accused. Spingarn's memo also suggested that McCarthy be 
charged with disloyalty if the senator did not hand over his 
list to "responsible officials."^® The next day, reporters 
asked the president about the allegations. 
While more temperate than his reaction a week earlier, 
the President staked out an absolute position. He agreed 
with the Department of State that "there was not a word of 
truth in what the Senator said."" In a speech broadcast 
nationwide on radio and television a few days later, he 
chastised the Republicans for inventing "new scare words" to 
precipitate a scandal and to erode public support for the 
New Deal and the Truman Doctrine.^® The jabs at McCarthy's 
loyalty, combined with a willingness to fit McCarthy into 
the larger political arena, reflected the administration's 
confidence that the problem could be turned to good account 
for the Democrats. Truman's tactic of billing McCarthy as 
the emblem of the GOP in order to score a political victory 
resembled that employed by the Republican right, which used 
the perceived failures of the State Department to indict the 
administration. Neither strategy was calculated to defuse 
the growing controversy. The partisan polemics captured the 
nation's attention, and pressure built for a resolution. In 
the absence of executive initiative, the issue fell to 
Congress a week later. 
On February 20, McCarthy took the floor of the Senate 
to explain himself, carrying a briefcase bulging with 
documents. Fully protected by congressional immunity, he 
invented an outrageous tale of treason involving the highest 
levels of government. Decorum in the upper chamber gave way 
to acrimony. Democrats, led by Majority Leader Scott Lucas 
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of Pennsylvania, challenged him at every turn, delineating 
inconsistencies and demanding proof. McCarthy, aided and 
abetted by a few members of the Republican right, parried 
the thrusts well enough to maintain the appearance of having 
a case. 
Recognizing that something had to be done, the Senate 
created a subcommittee to investigate. Known as the Tydings 
subcommittee after its chairman, Millard Tydings (D, Md) , it 
was granted the power to subpoena material from the 
administration. McCarthy heartily concurred; without 
subpoena powers, he chortled, the investigation would be a 
"whitewash. 
McCarthy's confidence probably came from the number of 
important allies popping up all over Washington. The China 
Lobby, a loose coalition of congressmen and well-connected 
lobbyists, publicly endorsed him and shared information with 
him privately. Members of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities (HUAC) also lent a hand. McCarthy's 
found support for his charges not merely from other critics 
of the president, but also from members of Truman 
administration. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney 
General Tom Clark had stated that there were subversives in 
government. Hoover, considered by most American as the 
guardian of national security, became a close ally of 
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McCarthy. The FBI Director's support for McCarthy became 
one of the reasons Truman had to both hate and fear Hoover's 
role in the Second Red Scare. 
Though probably aware of McCarthy's powerful 
supporters. Murphy, Spingarn, and their colleague George 
Elsey recognized that the power of subpoena caused big 
problems. The possibility of the Senate issuing a subpoena 
for files which the president had ordered closed in 1948 
opened up an abiding dispute over whether Congress 
ultimately held control over the executive branch. In 
addition, the staff knew that the information in the files, 
given the confused nature of the standard of disloyalty, 
represented a grave threat.The loyalty files contained a 
great deal of hearsay which, if applied to an extreme 
definition of disloyalty, could lead to another Hiss case. 
The staff tried to develop a position that would 
protect the White House from a congressional subpoena for 
its loyalty files. The subcommittee's license was, the 
administration maintained, "without question an unlawful 
intrusion by the Senate upon the constitutional prerogatives 
of the Chief Executive.Executive protection of State 
Department files was "not arbitrary or capricious," but 
based on "long-standing and sound constitutional theory and 
practice" recognized by the judicial branch. Keeping the 
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files from Congress also protected the efficacy of the 
president's loyalty program by keeping its sources and 
methods a secret. In short, the White House asserted that 
it would have to refuse a subpoena in order to protect both 
the constitution from abridgement and the nation from 
communists. 
The White House, becoming more certain with each 
passing day that McCarthy had no secret list, strove to keep 
the spotlight on the senator's untenable position. 
McCarthy had obtained leaked material and "recklessly-
repeated [it] with great injury to innocent individuals."^^ 
"The repetition of these charges" was not a constructive 
dialogue, rather it had "given aid and comfort to the 
enemies of this country."^® Acheson and Peurifoy told the 
press they welcomed the coming investigation.^® 
At the same time, the White House also realized that 
keeping the files closed opened itself up to charges of 
covering up misdeed or mistakes. It worked to avoid the 
impression that it intended to obstruct the congressional 
investigation. Elsey and Spingarn scuttled their idea of a 
presidential commission to study the government's Loyalty 
and Security program "in view of the poor circumstances 
right now."^° Days later, the newspapers revealed that 
McCarthy's list had been exhumed from the files of a 
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congressional investigation conducted in 1948. When asked 
whether such a damaging revelation about McCarthy would 
influence his decision to withhold employee records from the 
Tydings subcommittee, the president demurred. He would 
"answer that question when it comes up."^^ A week later, 
Truman held meetings with Vice President Alben Barkley, 
Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, House Majority Leader John 
McCormack and the Democrats on the subcommittee: Millard 
Tydings, Brian McMahon and Theodore Greene. Truman agreed 
secretly to open some of the files if it became necessary, 
though the president insisted on keeping the material 
restricted. 
The agreement created a discrepancy between the White 
House's public and private position. Charles Murphy, the 
president's senior domestic policy advisor at the White 
House, advised the president to announce that the 
subcommittee would have access to files.After declaring 
his trust in the subcommittee's discretion. Murphy 
suggested, Truman should then characterize the present case 
as exceptional because part of the files, the incriminating 
part, had already been released. Thus, he concluded, the 
files could be released without endangering executive 
privilege. Truman should then make clear that only this one 
exception would be made and that congressional investigators 
would see the files subject to White House restrictions. 
The State Department agreed with Murphy. 
The strategy was discussed at the next morning's staff 
meeting. After listening to the proposal, Truman decided 
against informing the public of his intention to allow the 
Tydings subcommittee access to the loyalty files of employee 
if such access became the last alternative.^^ Secure in the 
knowledge that McCarthy had no proof, Truman and Acheson 
felt that 'Tailgunner Joe' would soon be remanded to 
obscurity.^® And that would be the end, they predicted, of 
all this nonsense about communists in government. To 
expedite this eminent political victory, the president 
publicly impugned McCarthy's loyalty and motivation at a 
news conference just before the subcommittee convened.^® 
His staff dutifully spread the message.^® 
Other members of the administration, however, put their 
own spin on the official White house line. While J. Edgar 
Hoover and J. Howard McGrath, Truman's new Attorney General, 
opposed McCarthy's demand for congressional access to 
employee records, they did so without condemning the man at 
the center of this storm. After citing their fear that a 
congressional review would harm innocent employees. Hoover 
and McGrath emphasized that their main concern was national 
security.^® The release of the files, they asserted, would 
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irreparably "damage..the investigative process of" the FBI. 
Informants had to be protected. The communists stood to 
learn too much if the files were released. Hoover's 
position, that a congressional investigation into the FBI's 
loyalty files threatened national security, resembled 
Truman's contention that McCarthy threatened national 
security. The sum of Truman and Hoover's position amounted 
to a defense of the loyalty program. McCarthy, on the other 
hand, argued that the administration's program had failed. 
Anti-communism was thus rapidly becoming a game of 
oneupsmanship. 
Having resolved to release the files, but only if 
necessary, Truman stepped aside to let the State Department 
and the Tydings subcommittee discredit McCarthy. The 
Tydings subcommittee got off to a rocky start. The 
investigation began on March 8, just days after Judith 
Coplon, an employee of the Justice Department, was caught 
giving secrets to her Russian lover and Klaus Fuchs was 
sentenced to prison for selling atomic secrets to the 
Soviets. But as the days passed, McCarthy failed to provide 
the solid evidence he had promised, though he continued to 
issue new charges. The Democrats on the subcommittee, 
certain of a speedy and complete repudiation of McCarthy, 
frequently allowed their contempt for the Senator to show. 
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With adroit maneuvering, McCarthy avoided any decisive tests 
of his cases, leaving the newspapers filled with charges of 
treason and slander coming from both sides. 
Under Secretary Peurifoy and the State Department's 
legal advisor, Adrian Fisher, added to the conflagration, 
issuing rebuttals to McCarthy at least once a week in State 
Department Bulletins. The bulletins, which went well beyond 
careful refutation, revealed the administration's confidence 
that it was sure to win the coming showdown with McCarthy. 
They thundered against "McCarthy's resuscitation of these 
dead, discredited, disproven charges" and charged him with 
"deliberately distorting the facts.'"'"' The bulletins also 
strove to taint McCarthy with the hues of disloyalty. One 
of Peurifoy's headlines read "Results of Senator McCarthy's 
Loyalty Charges harmful to the conduct of Foreign 
Relations." Openly impugning his opponent as an opportunist 
who sowed dissension for personal gain, the Under secretary 
declared that anti-communism was "too important to be left 
to innuendo."^® With great vigor, the department contrasted 
McCarthy's anticommunism with the administration's, which 
was necessary and successful.^® In other words, the State 
department, along with the White House, the Justice 
Department and the FBI, readily conceded the vital 
importance of rooting out communism. The position gave the 
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public the impression that the dispute between the 
administration and the senator was a matter of degree. The 
administration was not, in the words of one historian, 
"rising above the debate to defuse the loaded ideology of 
Cold War anti-Communism."^^ The administration's position, 
that McCarthy was a liar and a dangerous partisan hack whose 
career would soon come to an abrupt end, also contributed to 
the Senator's increasing visibility. 
After a few weeks of hearings. Senator Tydings began 
complaining that McCarthy had mentioned one hundred names, 
but had proved nothing.^® Undaunted, McCarthy countered by 
announcing on March twenty-first that he would soon reveal 
the name of the "top Russian espionage agent" in America, 
that he was prepared "to stand or fall" on this case.^® 
His bluster led to an emergency closed-door session of the 
subcommittee, though McCarthy quickly leaked his charges to 
the press. 
His allegations against Owen Lattimore, a professor of 
Far Eastern affairs at John Hopkins University who had done 
some consulting work for the State Department years before, 
were as fantastic and insupportable as any to date. But the 
ruse generated enormous publicity. During the ensuing 
investigation, the McCarthyites tightened the connection 
between the story of ^betrayal' in the Far East and the 
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convictions of Hiss and others, touting them as the products 
of an administration rife with communists and communist 
sympathizers.^^ Lattimore was used, in other words, to 
highlight the discrepancy between the Truman Doctrine and 
the administration's policy in China. 
Rather than respond directly to McCarthy's use of his 
own ideology, Truman bet that McCarthy's dishonesty was too 
blatant to be further countenanced by Congress. It was a 
curious expectation to hold, given the refusal of most 
congressmen to get involved. Among Republicans, McCarthy 
had a growing number of allies, though his core supporters 
remained the right wing Republicans.^^ Aside from the 
members of the subcommittee (Tydings, McMahon and Greene) , 
few Democrats rose to condemn McCarthy, though most knew he 
had no proof. No one knew when another Alger Hiss might be 
uncovered, and it therefore did not pay to be perceived as a 
defender of communists. Moreover, the Democrats had nothing 
to gain by defending the executive branch's "constitutional" 
right to keeping the Lattimore file closed. In short. 
Congress did not have to choose Truman over McCarthy. In 
the words of historian Robert Griffith, the Lattimore case 
became "the lever for breaking up the bipartisan consensus 
which had shaped national policy since World War Two."^^ 
McCarthy, beneficiary of both an accommodating 
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political climate which he had not created and a stream of 
information and advice from Hoover and others, demanded that 
Truman prove that there were no communists in his 
administration by opening the files. By playing the role of 
honest patriot, McCarthy shifted the focus of the Tydings' 
investigation away from his charges and onto Truman's 
policy. Senator Tydings knew that he was losing control of 
the situation. He publicly requested access to government 
employee records in a letter to Acheson dated March 22.^^ 
The request placed the onus of deflating McCarthy squarely 
on the White House. 
Strange cross currents of opinion within the 
administration encouraged the White House to continue its 
uncompromising approach. Hoover and Attorney General 
McGrath counseled both Tydings and Truman against 
concession. None of McCarthy's cases, they told the 
president, merited a violation of executive privilege.Of 
course. Hoover was not without prejudice. The issue of 
domestic anti-communism had greatly enhanced the budget, 
reputation, and clout of the FBI. Its Director had reason 
to fear that releasing FBI files to Congress for examination 
and possible action would weaken his authority. Support for 
his and McGrath's position came from an unlikely source. 
Max Lowenthal, an unofficial but trusted advisor who worked 
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closely with Truman on this issue, agreed with McGrath and 
Hoover's conclusion.^® Lowenthal, known in the White House 
for his commitment to the principles of civil liberty, 
emphasized different reasons." The rumors and gossip 
contained in the files, he warned, would be leaked and put 
to use by the Republicans. His memorandum added that 
"Senator McCarthy and his associates will never be 
satisfied... [and] will claim the files were raped. 
Truman decided that, above all, McCarthy must be kept 
away from the files. Toward that end, he ordered Hoover and 
McGrath to testify before the Tydings subcommittee and give 
the members a private look at the Lattimore file.^® It was 
perfectly logical for the president to send his department 
heads over to Congress in order resolve misunderstandings. 
But the effect of this maneuver, as later described by 
Lowenthal, placed the issue in the media "on a basis 
astronomically larger than the Lattimore story had occupied 
prior to this act of appeasement."®" After examining the 
files, Tydings told the media that Lattimore had been proven 
innocent. The other Democratic members, McMahon and Greene, 
remained silent. The Republicans, Henry Cabot Lodge and 
Bourke Hickenlooper, disagreed with Tydings' conclusion. 
Lowenthal concluded that the disagreement amounted to strike 
one for the enemies of McCarthy. 
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The president took a vacation to Florida at the behest 
of his wife, who had rarely seen him so disturbed.®^ 
Describing his situation to his brother, Truman wrote "I am 
in the midst of the most terrible struggle any president 
ever had. A pathological liar from Wisconsin [McCarthy] and 
a block-headed undertaker from Nebraska [Senator Kenneth 
Wherry-R] are trying to ruin bipartisan foreign policy. 
Stalin never had two better allies in the Senate."®^ These 
were the words of a man angered by the growing maelstrom. 
While the contest between McCarthy and himself was rapidly 
becoming a question over who was the more virulent anti-
communist, Truman could not see beyond McCarthy's deceit. 
Giving in and handing the files over to the subcommittee at 
the insistence of someone as odious as Joe McCarthy violated 
the president's respect both for his office and for his 
honorable enterprise—the Cold War.®^ Senator Tydings felt 
similarly abused by McCarthy and therefore did not waive his 
request that Truman honor their secret agreement of a month 
ago. 
On March 29, Truman publicly refused to give the 
Tydings subcommittee unrestricted access to the loyalty 
files of government employees named by McCarthy. Citing the 
advice of his Attorney General and the Director of the FBI, 
the president reiterated the ethical, constitutional and 
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security reasons against opening the State Department 
files. But Truman also announced that the Loyalty Review 
Board (LRB), created by his security program, would examine 
all of the cases brought by McCarthy, and report directly to 
the White House. The president contended that the LRB was 
bipartisan because a Republican, Seth Richardson, ran it. 
As critics pointed out, however, it amounted to asking the 
LRB to investigate itself.®® The subcommittee was 
unimpressed and subpoenaed the files. Truman ordered the 
State Department to ignore the subpoena, and the White House 
issued several statements to reiterate its position.®"' The 
subcommittee's use of the subpoena, however, diminished the 
White House's strategic position. Truman's refusal to allow 
congressional access contrasted sharply with his insistence 
on an all-out war against the communist menace. 
Congressional investigators had, after all, uncovered Alger 
Hiss. 
Aware that his refusal placed him at odds with the 
growing public demand for a thorough examination, Truman 
reached out to his opposition by appealing to their support. 
of his foreign policy. To Republican Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg, Truman admitted he was "very much disturbed" by 
the threat the situation posed to bipartisan foreign 
policy.®® McCarthy's allegations, he complained, were not a 
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"real issue." Though sympathetic, Vandenberg was bedridden 
by ill-health and therefore unable to be of much help. But 
with the Senator's guidance, Truman attempted to broaden 
Republican support for his foreign policy by appointing two 
prominent, yet moderate internationalist Republicans, John 
Foster Dulles and John Cooper, into the foreign policy­
making apparatus.®® The President also wrote to a friend 
from his days in the upper chamber. Senator Styles Bridges, 
and asked him to refrain from joining the McCarthyites. 
After several letters failed, Peurifoy set up a meeting of 
the president, the Secretary of State and Senator Bridges. 
Though these were rather halting steps, the attempt to 
divide the Republican Party showed promise. Bridges, the 
ranking Republican in the Senate after Vandenberg, agreed to 
refrain from attacks on the State Department and its 
Secretary, an agreement which lasted until Truman fired 
MacArthur a year later.Dulles and Henry Stimson issued a 
statement defending the integrity of Secretary of State Dean 
Achescn."'^ Stimson, a GOP patrician, voiced his concern 
"over the extreme partisanship exhibited by McCarthy and 
other Republicans."'^^ Behind the scenes, however, 
congressional allies told the White House staff that the 
debate over internal security would not be resolved by the 
Tydings subcommittee "regardless of what happens to 
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McCarthy's charges."''^ 
In early spring of 1950, calls for a presidential 
coitunission as a means of resolving the conflict came from 
the press and several Democratic senators, including Hubert 
Humphrey and Millard Tydings. A few Republicans such as 
Senator Lodge and Representative Helen Douglas also 
mentioned the idea.^^ The White House was urged to create a 
non-partisan commission capable of rendering an "unbiased 
report." The proposed panel of prominent people would have 
access to all files. Names of possible members were 
recommended.''® But this silver cloud had a dark lining. 
Endorsements from, among others. Senators Nixon and McCarthy 
probably contributed to the administration's reluctance to 
create a commission.'''' Truman and his advisors had reason 
to fear the consequences of such action; it might turn into 
another forum for their enemies. Two of Truman's closest 
allies in Congress, Senator Majority Leader Scott Lucas and 
the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom 
Connally "thought it opened charges of cover-up."''® The 
president ignored the commission idea. 
The White House's effort to improve its relationship 
with Congress was overshadowed by Truman's appointment of 
Philip Jessup as Ambassador At Large on March 28. Jessup's 
case, one of McCarthy's favorite targets, was still under 
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review by the Tydings' subcommittee. Congress had delayed 
taking up Truman's nomination of Jessup until his case had 
been reviewed. The president's unilateral action amounted 
to an announcement that, in Truman's estimation, the purpose 
of the subcommittee was to find McCarthy guilty. The 
announcement undermined the president's relations with 
Congress as well as his public image. The president's 
endorsement of Jessup, like the Hiss case, dovetailed nicely 
with the McCarthyites contention that Truman had compromised 
national security—either because the president had been 
buffaloed by subversives within the administration or 
because Truman was more concerned with partisan politics 
than the security of the nation. 
The negative publicity generated by the Jessup 
endorsement prompted an angry outburst from Truman at a 
press conference two days later. His attack, rather 
unbecoming to his high office, sharpened his position on 
McCarthy. Truman labeled the Senator from Wisconsin "the 
greatest asset the Kremlin has." McCarthy and "certain 
members of the Republican Party" were "digging up that old 
malodorous horse isolationism."^® The president indicted 
his most prominent critics for sabotaging bipartisan foreign 
policy, which was "just as bad in this Cold War as it would 
be to shoot our soldiers in the back during a hot war."®° 
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Privately, the president hoped his remarks would put "these 
'animals' on the run."®^ 
Truman's comments marked an effort to recast his 
dispute with McCarthy over internal security into a debate 
over foreign policy. Focusing upon McCarthy's deceitful 
tactics and dangerous isolationism, Truman had framed the 
dispute between himself and McCarthy as an absolute choice 
of good versus evil, with the nation's survival hanging in 
the balance. It was a logical, if not completely accurate, 
summation of events. As a strategy, questioning the 
Senator's loyalty and motive offered Truman a chance of 
defeating his critic while strengthening the nation's 
commitment to containment. The White House staff agreed 
with his thesis because it emphasized Truman's foreign 
policy, which was popular.®^ Asked for his reaction to the 
president's denunciation. Senator Taft accused Truman of 
smearing McCarthy.®^ Truman wondered aloud if that were 
possible.®^ The hearings in the Senate were equally ugly.®^ 
Senator McCarthy thrived. 
To buttress his preposterous accusations against 
Professor Lattimore, McCarthy arranged for Louis Budenz to 
testify before the subcommittee in early April. Budenz, a 
former editor of the Communist Party's Daily Worker who had 
since renounced his faith in communism, had made a 
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profession of testifying as a witness for the FBI against 
the Communist Party since 194 5. His appearance at this 
crucial time had to have come about with the blessing of J. 
Edgar Hoover. The former party member arrived to a 
committee room packed with reporters on April 20. He did 
not disappoint the audience. Budenz identified Owen 
Lattimore as a communist, though he offered only hearsay as 
proof. 
In the ensuing weeks, other witnesses and Lattimore's 
lawyers comprehensively demolished Budenz's testimony, but 
to little discernable effect. McCarthy remained at the 
forefront of the ever-growing controversy, though the 
nation's most prominent and respected newspapers had begun 
to criticize him. The appearance of Budenz scared Senator 
Tydings. The subcommittee chairman pleaded with Truman to 
"re-establish the White House...as the foe of international 
communism" by releasing the files and making a nationwide 
speech. 
Murphy, Spingarn and Elsey agreed. "The problem," as a 
White House memo formulated it, "is how to restore the 
Truman administration's reputation as the foe of communists 
at home and abroad, reunite people behind the foreign 
policy, and take the issue away from the Republicans so they 
cannot weaken the president's domestic program."®® Truman's 
aides counseled him to concede the files issue. After being 
certified by Loyalty Review Board Chairmen Seth Richardson; 
the Chairman of the State Department's loyalty program, 
General Conrad Snow; and J. Edgar Hoover, all the files 
mentioned by McCarthy would be delivered to the Tydings' 
comirdttee. Emphasizing the precautions that would be taken 
to protect the employees involved, the president would 
defend his decision to deliver the files "because of the 
unusual nature of the times."®® Without such a drastic 
measure, his staff warned, the "stock and trade" of the 
Republicans in the coming elections would be the accusation 
that there must be something in the files or administration 
would release them. 
The White House staff had not recommended the 
concession on the loyalty files as a means to inspire 
cooperation between the administration and the Congress or 
as a challenge to McCarthy's extreme interpretation of anti-
communism. It was a vehicle for demonstrating the 
president's commitment to anti-communism. The president 
would appear on national television to defend the loyalty 
program and the Republican who ran it by highlighting the 
vigorous prosecution of communists. The administration 
could then claim credit for all the spies that had been and 
would be caught. The staff also intended the concession as 
a means to create a decisive moment within which to seize 
the initiative. They advised Truman to announce the 
appointment of a presidential commission to investigate the 
twin problems of loyalty and internal security. The staff 
argued that a commission would restore public confidence in 
the administration, at which point "President Truman will 
carry the ball."®° More important, "the [proposed] 
investigating commission will bring in a ringing report 
which ought to completely lift the issue out of the next 
election." This attempt to spur the president to take 
immediate action failed. Truman still held faith that 
McCarthy "will eventually get all that is coming to him."®^ 
There was reason enough to believe that McCarthy's 
house of cards would soon fall. After two months of 
hearings and a stampede of allegations, McCarthy had 
produced little evidence. More ex-communists testified, 
some of whom agreed with his allegations against various 
members of the administration, while others did not. Adding 
a touch of comedy to the proceedings, one of the senator's 
witnesses "blacked out" just prior to his appearance before 
the Tydings subcommittee, only to awaken in another city.®^ 
Ever the showman, McCarthy simply ignored the gaff as he 
hammered unremittingly upon the nation's fear of communism. 
On April 20, McCarthy told the American Society of 
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Newspaper Editors that the files would have been opened had 
they been clean. Noting the Senator's uncanny ability to 
survive, Elsey conceded that the speech was an "impressive 
performance. 
Unwilling to take his staff's advice and concede the 
files issue, the president mounted a sustained campaign to 
explain and defend his policies, a campaign that lasted 
through April. Vice President Alben Barkley, Representative 
Tom Connally, Dean Acheson and General Thorpe defended 
Lattimore.®^ Conrad Snow, a member of the GOP and Chairman 
of the State Department's Loyalty Review Board, defended the 
administration's loyalty program in a speech to Tydings 
Committee on April 5. The State Department reprinted and 
distributed Snow's speech.®^ The White House also received 
support from the Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, Seth 
Richardson. Richardson pointed out that "no cases involving 
espionage, treason, [or] sabotage had ever been found by the 
Loyalty Review Board," it had dealt only with the question 
of potential.®® In the meantime. White House aides tried 
unsuccessfully to get articles critical of McCarthy printed 
in the congressional record.®'^ A few Senate Democrats 
defended the embattled Secretary of State, though Acheson 
had few strong supporters in Congress. 
Acheson did make an effort to improve his relations 
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with Congress, and even appeared before the Society of 
Newspaper Editors shortly after McCarthy. He chose to 
criticize the tactics of the McCarthyites rather than the 
man himself.®® Soon thereafter, he and three former 
Secretaries of State (Cordell Hull, James Byrnes, and George 
Marshall), collaborated on a denial of McCarthy's allegation 
that Lattimore was involved in the development of American 
Foreign Policy. The letter lauded Acheson's tenure and 
disparaged the accusations against him as "mad and 
vicious.The imbroglio, the former secretaries 
concluded, aided the Reds. The White House was encouraged 
by Acheson's ef forts. But the Secretary had little 
stomach for politics, and went back to formulating policy. 
Under Secretary Peurifoy kept up the counterattack on 
McCarthy. 
While the administration's spokesmen went after 
McCarthy directly. President Truman refused to comment 
directly upon the senator's conduct, preferring to deal with 
the larger problem of McCarthyism instead. He made a 
number of speeches in which he pledged himself to work with 
"responsible" Republicans in the pursuit of bipartisan 
foreign policy.^"'' But Truman would not compromise. As he 
made clear at time, "responsible" critics were those who 
sought to improve the system he had developed. Truman's 
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narrow definition of "responsible criticism" effectively 
negated his pledges of bipartisanship, as did his attempts 
to set the record straight on the question of who was 
defeating the communists. 
In an address before the Federal Bar Association on 
April 24, the President reviewed and praised his foreign and 
domestic policies. He heralded the United States as the 
champion of freedom against tyrannical oppression. Against 
this grand backdrop, Truman repeated the legal and moral 
reasons for his refusal to yield to the Tydings' 
investigation. Casting himself as the preeminent anti-
communist crusader, he stated that he would not open the 
files. The widely publicized speech also characterized 
his loyalty and security program as wise and effective. 
Angered by the ravages of McCarthyism and convinced that he 
was right, the president made a crucial error. Though he 
had only intended to bolster his anti-communist credentials 
to reassure a troubled nation, he had conceded the 
fundamental point to his enemy. 
The praise of his loyalty program represented a 
critical error because Truman had sanctioned the program's 
extreme definition of disloyalty, a definition similar to 
McCarthy's. Truman had also implicitly endorsed the files 
produced by the program, files filled with hearsay. From an 
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ethical standpoint, the praise neglected the 
administration's duty to redress the legal and moral 
problems noted by his domestic policy staff prior to 
McCarthy's emergence. From a tactical standpoint, Truman's 
position foreclosed the opportunity to draw a meaningful 
distinction between his anti-communism and that of McCarthy. 
It also precluded the graceful admission of mistakes—though 
by this time most Americans feared that some had been made. 
Perhaps unaware of all that had been sacrificed, the White 
House could certainly recognize that the speeches had 
changed nothing. After all the speeches, Truman still 
needed Senator Tydings to find a hole in McCarthy's 
allegations and drive a truck through it. 
McCarthy kept moving. As March gave way to April, he 
targeted William Remington, an employee at the Commerce 
Department who had been investigated and cleared by the LRB 
in 1949. The Loyalty Review Board was currently re­
examining Remington's case at Truman's request. Worried 
lest the case lead to a further erosion of the president's 
credibility, Spingarn advised Murphy to blame any oversight 
in the Remington case on the members of the LRB.^°® Max 
Lowenthal, who came to the White House almost daily to help 
Truman with the McCarthy problem, had more on his mind than 
handling the Remington problem. In late April, he advocated 
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a radical departure in the White House's public position. 
Lowenthal advised Truman to condemn the FBI and the LRB 
for the same reasons he condemned the McCarthyites. 
According to him, McCarthy, Hoover, and other extreme 'Cold 
Warriors' had confused the distinction between membership in 
the Communist Party and actual subversives.^" The 
distinction between employees who had left-wing associations 
and those few who were spies "needs to be driven home in 
order to deflate the McCarthy operation, the Hearst 
press... [and] investigators in the executive and legislative 
branches whose appropriations and size comes from making use 
of public clamor." Educating the public on "the facts of 
life, " Lowenthal promised, would remedy the problem. 
Regardless of the programs adopted, the government would 
never be 100 percent sure of the loyalty of its employees. 
The meinbers of the Communist Party, he stressed, are "few in 
number and...in themselves constitute no danger to our 
nation." If the public learned this, the discovery of 
spies "prior to any election" would become a lot less 
damaging. But as long as the confusion remained, the 
identification of communists within government helped the 
McCarthyites. 
Criticizing McCarthy for blurring the distinction 
between harmless political associations and subversive 
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activities was part of the administration's public 
position.^"® The White House's effort to sharpen the 
public's definition of loyalty, however, remained 
ineffectual. Attempts to distinguish liberals from 
communists coexisted uneasily with the dominant theme of 
Truuian's rhetoric, the Cold War. The main reason, however, 
that the White House could not reveal McCarthy's ridiculous 
use of the word communist was that Truman refused to condemn 
the extremism within the administration. Under the Smith 
Act, the administration had tried and convicted eleven men 
for membership in the Communist Party. The president would 
not slacken his commitment to anti-communism, nor attack one 
of the most successful and respected practitioners of it, J. 
Edgar Hoover. Nor would Truman forsake his loyalty 
program, which operated on the principle of guilt by 
association. Yet the problem of what to do about McCarthy 
remained. 
Truman convinced himself that producing the documents 
would dispel all of the false accusations against state 
department employees. As he explained to Tydings on May 4, 
the day Peurifoy secretly informed Tydings that the White 
House planned to allow the subcommittee access to the files, 
"McCarthy could not continue to lie and get away with it," 
the Senate would eventually expel him.^^^ 
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The next morning, Lowenthal protested the decision to 
allow congressional access. Conceding that the Senator's 
melodramatics were "unprecedented in recent American 
politics" and pernicious to the administration, the 
president's old friend was troubled by the implications of 
this "doubtful procedure."--^ In the second of two long 
memorandums, he insisted that "at every stage some yielding 
to the McCarthy crowd or to the clamor they have produced 
has taken place," but concessions have only helped the 
"McCarthy forces. He cited as examples the Senate's 
decision to appoint a subcommittee to investigate, and the 
White House decision to send Hoover and McGrath to the 
subcommittee with the Lattimore file. "Giving in to prevent 
them from saying the administration is hiding something 
accomplishes nothing." Desperate to get Truman to 
reconsider, Lowenthal ended by asking if "there had been no 
yielding on point after point, would the publicity, ...the 
smearing, the use of this situation for political purposes, 
have been any worse or more damaging than it has been to 
date?"^^® 
But that afternoon, the administration announced that 
the subcommittee would have access to the eighty-one cases 
currently in dispute. Though a major political retreat, the 
administration demonstrated that it had learned a few 
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lessons. The White House took extreme care that none of the 
contents of the files could be leaked. Senators viewed the 
files in the executive offices without their staff and under 
White House supervision. The members of the subcommittee 
were also required to examine the files together; a month 
earlier, Senator Hickenlooper had inhibited the resolution 
of the Lattimore case by not attending the subcommittee 
hearings on the day Hoover showed Lattimore's file.^^'' These 
restrictions allowed the White House to minimize the impact 
upon employees and to maximize the political gain. 
Administration spokesmen claimed that these files had 
already been shown to Congress before Truman imposed a ban 
in March of 1948. The explanation was neither much of a fig 
leaf nor entirely true. The White House knew that files 
contained material that had been added in the intervening 
period. 
The concession was a pivotal event in the rivalry 
between Truman and McCarthy; everyone wondered if Judgement 
Day had finally arrived. The president figured that his 
disclosure of the evidence would "put McCarthy in the 'dog 
house' and we won't have to mention him anymore even 
politically. 
While the files were examined, Truman took a train trip 
out West in an effort, he said privately, to position 
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himself as an effective leader of the free world and to 
"incidentally damn" the McCarthyites. He made over fifty 
speeches in twelve states. The magnitude of McCarthy 
problem had not inspired the president to be less abrasive 
toward Republicans or less extreme in his anti-communism. 
Nominally billed as a non-partisan tour, the speeches all 
contained warnings against the return to isolationism led by 
the Republican party.As one reporter noted, "anyone over 
the age of ten knows whom a Democratic president refers to 
when he speaks blandly of...acorn minds, prophets of gloom, 
the lunatic f rings... [and] die-hard reactionaries. 
Though consistent in his criticism of contradictions within 
the GOP, Truman was considerably less so when it came to his 
own position. His speeches stressed "the important steps 
which have been taken by the government in recent years in 
an effort to counter and neutralize communist activities in 
this country. At the same time, however, he stated again 
and again that he did not consider domestic subversion a 
"real issue. 
The State Department kept up a steady drum beat of 
rebuttal against McCarthy's "fraudulent charges. Press 
releases from the State Department quoted from European and 
Eastern Bloc newspapers to support the contention that 
McCarthy's charges injured US foreign policy. Following 
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the line of the White House, Peurifoy's and Fisher's press 
statements also touted the efficacy and wisdom of the 
loyalty program. The official line also highlighted the 
fact that Republicans ran the program and that Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg had praised it. 
Neither the vigorous speeches nor the release of the 
files made a discernable impact upon McCarthy's stature. 
True to form, he admonished the public not to expect too 
much; the files, he warned, "might be rifled. While the 
Tydings subcommittee floundered, McCarthy continued to speak 
all over the country, receiving awards, donations, and 
headlines. His rhetoric had not wavered a bit. He kept 
critics at bay by correlating their opposition with a 
softness toward communism. He continued to parade 
witnesses, many of whom had been on the FBI's payroll for 
years, before the Tydings subcommittee as corroboration for 
his stream of accusations . 
The Republican Party acquiesced to the charade because 
the party had not occupied the White House since 1933, and 
some saw trumping the president on the issue of anti-
communism as the path to power. As one prominent GOP 
leader explained it to columnist James Reston: 
The issue [of domestic subversion] is very 
simple...It is now a political issue, and 
somebody's going to gain or lose politically 
before its over. It all comes down to this: are 
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we going to win an election or aren't we?"-^^^ 
Though Truman and his staff agreed with Republicans 
that McCarthyism was a "political adventure," only Elsey, 
Spingarn and Murphy wanted to do something about it.^^^ On 
May 10, a week after the concession on the employee files, 
they advised Truman to prevent more Republican victories by 
terminating congressional access forthwith. Something also 
had to be done about the subcommittee, they warned, because 
it had been "used by McCarthy as a vehicle for publicizing 
unjustified smears. Much was made of the fact that both 
Republican moderates and newspaper columnists had recognized 
that congressional investigation "was the wrong way to 
handle the business." 
In another memorandum of the same day, Spingarn and 
Murphy pointed out that the problem was deepening. The two 
White House advisors most involved in the McCarthy problem, 
Spingarn and Murphy, voiced their concern that the 
government's loyalty and security program was "not in all 
cases being adequately scrutinized from the standpoint of 
encroachments on individual rights. The administration 
needed to find a balance between security and civil 
rights.^^® Murphy and Spingarn's immediate concern was the 
Justice Department which had "erred on the side of 
excessive" by supporting House Bill #10, which would have 
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empowered the Attorney General to deport suspected 
communists. 
A week later Murphy and Spingarn repeated their request 
to the president to reign in Attorney General McGrath. 
Truman should request that all Justice Department bills be 
cleared with the Department's Civil Rights branch. A few 
days later Truman, concerned about "excessive security," 
sent Spingarn over to talk to McGrath and clarify his 
position. The president said that he favored strengthening 
legislation against communists, but wanted the rights of the 
individual protected. 
Murphy and Spingarn, however, considered the Justice's 
Department's stance as only one example of a much larger 
problem. On May 16, they warned Truman that "the Cold War 
has increased interest in internal security. Many new 
bills to strengthen internal security were being sponsored 
in Congress; executive action was needed in order to 
maintain a balance between liberty and security. A few days 
later, Spingarn, Murphy and Elsey cautioned the president 
that the report from the Tydings subcommittee would not 
effectively counter McCarthy's accusations. Truman's staff 
agreed with Tydings and McMahon; the subcommittee was bound 
to "split along Party lines, and the country will regard any 
conclusions which a majority of that subcommittee reaches as 
political and will not be satisfied with them."^^° The fact 
that most of the subcommittee's members faced re-election in 
the fall, they concluded, would only increase factionalism 
in the upper chamber. Further, the memorandum pointed out, 
the McCarthyites could be relied upon to continue the 
attack. These key members of the president's staff argued 
that a Presidential Commission on Internal Security and 
Individual Rights (PCISIR) would serve to diminish the 
confusion and hysteria. 
Presidential Assistant Donald Dawson opposed the PCISIR 
proposal. Quite simply, he did not want the president to 
take on Congress. The Tydings subcommittee had not endorsed 
the proposal formally. Therefore, Dawson concluded, the 
subcommittee "would have to announce some conclusions prior 
to stepping out in favor of [the PCISIR]—and from every 
indication, it would seem impossible to obtain a unanimous 
report. Another prerequisite for replacing the 
subcommittee with a presidential panel was a statement from 
subcommittee announcing that they had examined the loyalty 
files and had found no evidence to support the charges of 
Senator McCarthy. Lodge and Hickenlooper, Dawson predicted, 
would certainly refuse. Their refusal would be portrayed by 
the McCarthyites as proof "that there are communists in the 
State Department." 
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Aside from the problems of implementing a presidential 
commission, Dawson feared the impression it might create in 
the minds of voters. Establishing a presidential panel 
would give the appearance that the president had no 
confidence in the LRB's review of the files. A panel would 
be interpreted as a sign of fear on Tydings' part. "It 
might also be interpreted," he concluded, "as lending 
support to the belief that the administration is seriously 
concerned about McCarthy's charges. Dawson's appraisal 
may have found favor with the president, who had often said 
that the charges were not a real issue, but intransigence 
was becoming increasingly hard for the White House to 
maintain. 
The lead story of the Washington Times Herald on May 18 
revealed that Senate Democrats were unwilling to accede to 
White House requests and insert State Department Bulletins 
concerning McCarthy i nto t he Congressional R e c o rd.Soon 
thereafter, the White House received copies of two recent 
surveys of public opinion. The polls indicated 84% of 
Americans knew of McCarthy's charges and many approved of 
his efforts. The disclosure of loyalty files to the 
subcommittee had had little impact. The public's message 
registered with Chairman Tydings, who gave up and pleaded 
for some type of presidential action that would get him off 
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the hook by offering an alternative "detached from 
politics."^''® According to one top aide, "the president took 
the position that Tydings had gotten himself into it, and 
now it was up to him to get out of it."^''"' 
For the rest of May and most of June, however, the 
president's top advisors on domestic issues in the White 
House, in the State Department, and others with close 
connections to Congress, developed the idea of a 
presidential commission in hopes of convincing the 
president. They had little choice. By June 8, Senator 
Tydings had, according to the White House, "given every 
indication of being in a state of panic and of lacking any 
backbone or courage in dealing with the situation. 
Calling several times daily, Tydings even requested that the 
president set "a date within which the subcommittee should 
complete its study of the files. As Truman's staff 
noted, setting such a condition would "solve nothing and 
would undoubtedly result in charges that the president was 
trying to bottle things up."^^^ 
Murphy, who as Truman's second in command on domestic 
policy may have handled many of the calls from Tydings, did 
support Tydings' request that a special panel be grafted 
onto the LRB, one designed simply to review the dispositions 
of the 81 cases brought by McCarthy. Truman approved of 
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this half-step and encouraged Tydings to finish with the 
files soon, in order that he could then give them to the new 
panel. With the support of Seth Richardson, the president 
asked the Civil Service Coininission, which appointed the LRB, 
to create the new panel. The proposal, however, 
foundered. The Vvhite House had difficulty recruiting 
distinguished citizens willing to serve on it, and the 
president remained skeptical about the need for it. 
According to Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers, Truman 
insisted that Tydings fix the problem. 
During the first half of June, the administration 
appeared to score much-needed victories. A Federal Grand 
Jury, which had been investigating a case of alleged 
communist subversion, found that the government had 
overlooked nothing in its investigation. While not a 
ringing endorsement, the report forced the McCarthyites to 
drop that particular case from their litany of 
allegations. More important, dissatisfaction with the 
reckless and unsubstantiated charges of McCarthy finally 
flared among moderate Republicans. On the Hill, Margaret C. 
Smith (R, Maine) and five other Republican senators issued a 
Declaration of Conscience. They categorized the tactics of 
the McCarthyites as malevolent, though not by name.^^® 
But these events could hardly be mistaken for a turning 
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point. Smith's oblique criticism of the McCarthyites met 
with silence on the floor on the Senate. As she later 
recalled, "Joe McCarthy had the Senate paralyzed with 
fear."^^'' Moreover, Senator Smith's declaration had also 
reproached the administration for its handling of internal 
security, "its refusal to accept criticism, and its 
ineffective leadership. 
Truman did not take Smith's warning about his 
ineffective leadership as a sign of a serious breach between 
himself and Congress. He choose instead to emphasize the 
positive. When asked about the Declaration, Truman said "he 
wouldn't want to make a comment as strong as that about the 
Republican party. Privately, he told aides that Senator 
Smith "had trimmed [the truth] a little. In other words, 
the president thought that Senator Smith had not gone far 
enough in her condemnation of McCarthy. His inability to 
accept criticism reflected a narrow understanding of 
bipartisanship. The president had not considered that he 
might need to offer a concession with Congress in order to 
isolate his most rabid critics. 
Truman's aides were aware of the threat posed by a 
congressional reassertion of power over the implementation 
of domestic anti-communism and they obviously feared what 
effect that might have on Truman's overall credibility. On 
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June 14, Administrative Assistant David Bell informed Murphy 
that members of Congress had created a subcommittee to draft 
legislation with respect to disloyalty in peace time. 
Because the new subcommittee, chaired by Senator Magnussen, 
"expects to cover about the same ground as the proposed 
PCISIR," Bell advised that the President act now in order to 
"get the spotlight" and thereby "strike a resounding blow 
against" congressional initiatives.^®^ Spingarn seconded the 
opinion, and included a draft of a presidential order with 
his memorandum. He also asked the president to consider 
coordinating his actions with Magnussen, whom Spingarn 
regarded as less dangerous than some other members of 
Congress. 
On the evening of June twenty-second, Truman held a 
meeting to consider the PCISIR proposal.^" Those present 
included top White House aides, congressional leaders, and 
the heads of the government's security apparatus. All the 
president's aides supported the proposal. Clark Clifford, 
formerly Truman's Special Council, also favored the plan. 
Of the three Democrats on the subcommittee, two (Tydings and 
McMahon) supported the proposal. The third. Senator Greene, 
did not. The Attorney General and the Director of the FBI, 
with the full support of the absent LRB Chairman Seth 
Richardson, repeated their opposition to the PCISIR. 
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Vice-President Alben Barkley, Speaker of the House Sam 
Rayburn, and House Majority Leader Tom McCormack also 
opposed the plan. Greene, Barkley, and the others contended 
that McCarthy's momentum was diminishing, and therefore the 
proposal would help him revive his political fortunes by 
allowing him to claim that he had been right all along. 
Furthermore, the plan would instigate a nasty fight that 
would keep Congress in session and McCarthy in the 
spotlight. Barkley and the others advised Truman to let 
the subcommittee handle the problem, while publicizing the 
fact that McCarthy was "a constitutional liar and a 
political opportunist."^®® 
On that note. Senator Clinton Anderson appraised the 
president of a "devastating dossier" of McCarthy that, if 
used correctly, would "blow Senator McCarthy's whole show 
sky high."^®'^ One of those present at the meeting, writer 
John Hersey, later recalled Truman made some "pithy and 
bitter" comments about McCarthy before replying: 
You must not ask the president of the United 
States to get down in the gutter with a 
guttersnipe. Nobody, not even the president of 
the United States, can approach too close to a 
skunk...and expect to get anything out of it 
except a bad smell. If you think somebody is 
telling a lie on you, the only answer is with the 
whole truth. 
The president concluded the meeting at Blair House by 
asking everyone to "think about it some more and we'll get 
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together again later. He ultimately declined the advice 
to take action because of his optimism--an optimism born 
curiously from fatalism. Truman had come to view McCarthy, 
and the brand of politics he personified, as an aberration. 
His opinion had been reenforced by a "Study of Witch Hunting 
and Hysteria," prepared by White House Aide Kenneth Hechler, 
a historian on leave from Princeton University. The study 
linked the frantic politics of the McCarthyites to larger, 
cyclical trends in American history. Truman and Hechler 
attributed the popularity of the Republican right to the 
same forces that had produced such unsavory periods in 
American history as the Alien and Sedition Acts and the 
Salem Witch Trials. According to Hechler, social change, 
economic downturns, and international tension precipitated 
these periods of hysteria. At no point did Hechler 
illuminate the causes of the political dynamic which had 
elevated McCarthy into McCarthyism; it explained McCarthyism 
only in terms of these other periods. Hechler's study, 
therefore, also lacked a consideration of the president's 
role in creating the nation's anti-communism. 
The views expressed by Hechler were not new—he had, in 
fact, merely expanded and codified ideas which the 
administration had expressed since the very beginning. But 
the study affirmed the president's rather convenient 
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fatalism. Confounded by a rhetorical stand-off after five 
months of denunciations and concessions, Truman resigned 
himself to wait until the hysteria passed, at which time the 
American people would see McCarthy for what he was. The 
president took comfort in the knowledge that he stood for 
what was right and he would be vindicated in the long run.^^^ 
He would therefore hold a steady course, between the false 
patriots on one side and the communists spies on the other. 
This sense of resignation was a far cry from his optimism of 
a few months ago, but he had little choice at this point. 
McCarthy's blatant and crude deceit—and his apparent 
vulnerability to being exposed as a fraud—had encouraged 
the White House to respond with absolute contempt. Truman 
had assumed that Congress would destroy McCarthy for him. 
Acting almost as though Alger Hiss had not been convicted, 
as though China and the Soviet Union had not dashed 
America's hopes for the post-war world, the president 
attempted to use McCarthy to strengthen his position. 
But the dangerous extremism of Cold War anti-communism 
combined with events at home and abroad to produce a great 
deal of public anxiety. Aware that McCarthy had struck a 
responsive chord with voters. Congress refused to validate 
Truman's anti-communism by repudiating him. After all the 
scorn leveled at him, McCarthy's survival reflected poorly 
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upon the Truman administration. In the absence of any-
congressional or legal decision, the issue of the Senator's 
veracity had devolved into a contest between Truman and 
McCarthy over who was the more extreme anti-communist. 
Having validated the brand of extreme anti-communism wielded 
by McCarthy, Truman could not criticize McCarthy without 
appearing to contradict his own position on anti-communism. 
Frustrated by the strategic straight-jacket in which he 
found himself, the president blamed cyclical patterns in 
American history. Much to the president's misfortune, over 
the next few months a series of events, events which the 
president's fatalism did not equip him to handle 
successfully, further eroded his credibility. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Hemorrhage of Power 
Despite the tumult of the spring of 1950, Truman had 
decided to await events. He did not have to wait long. In 
the early hours of June 24, Truman received word that North 
Korea had invaded the Republic of South Korea. The strength 
of the nation's commitment to the Cold War left little doubt 
over America's reaction. As the White House well knew, the 
public could be counted on to support American intervention 
in the Korean War; the war thus gave the president what he 
had longed for during months filled with Joe McCarthy: the 
initiative. Truman misused it. He made no attempt to 
remove the war from his contest against the McCarthyites. 
Rather, Truman considered the war, like the congressional 
anti-communist initiatives and the off-year elections, as 
either a victory for himself or McCarthy. His credibility, 
hinged as it was upon the exigencies of war, was gone by 
December of 1950. 
Within hours of receiving the news that North Korea had 
invaded the Republic of South Korea, the White House began 
to prepare a military campaign. The United States would 
defend South Korea from an invasion that Truman and his 
advisors assumed was financed by and planned in Beijing and 
Moscow. Truman's decision to intervene was an unequivocal 
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affirmation of the administration's commitment to the 
universalist principles articulated in the Truman Doctrine. 
Communism could not be allowed to spread. 
American involvement in Korea was a popular move in the 
short term. The House of Representatives, including the 
Republican right, overwhelmingly supported the decision. 
While also generally supportive, the Senate was concerned by 
the president's refusal to ask for a declaration of war.^ 
As one of the president's most powerful rivals. Senator 
Robert Taft, observed, Truman had made "no pretense of 
bipartisanship on the decision."^ Congress received a 
statement on the war from the president nearly a month 
later. Even then, Truman did not seek its formal approval.^ 
Such unilateral executive policy was not likely to 
rejuvenate bipartisan foreign policy. 
The president maintained that asking Congress for a 
declaration of war would weaken the executive branch by 
limiting executive prerogatives. He acted unilaterally, 
therefore, to protect the executive branch's constitutional 
right to formulate foreign policy. Truman certainly had 
just cause to mistrust the Senate. Had his conception of 
presidential authority been a bit less extreme, however, he 
might have found a way to get congressional approval without 
endangering executive prerogatives. The Republican right 
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would have found it as hard to oppose military intervention. 
They had long criticized Truman for neglecting Asia.'' The 
president certainly missed an opportunity to create a spirit 
of both cooperation with Congress, and of bipartisanship. 
His extreme ideas of presidential leadership and of anti-
communism, combined with his optimism about the war's affect 
upon McCarthyism, drove him to make decisive foreign policy 
rather than broker domestic compromise. By his own hand 
then, Korea became Harry Truman's war. A great deal of his 
political fate hung on its outcome. 
Truman clearly anticipated that his intervention in 
Korea would bring immediate political benefits.^ The 
president and his congressional allies knew that committing 
troops demonstrated resolve, thereby answering the 
Republican right's charges that the administration lacked 
the courage to stand up to the communists, and that Asia had 
been forsaken in the implementation of the doctrine of 
containment.® Truman and his supporters assumed that the 
United States could win in South Korea and that this would 
give him an advantage in his battle of one-upmanship with 
McCarthy. 
Some of president's domestic political staff, however, 
disagreed with the prevailing White House interpretation."' 
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Over the next few months, Spingarn, along with Murphy and 
Elsey (spurred on by Spingarn's incessant memorandums), 
campaigned against the notion "that the Korean situation has 
driven McCarthy off the front pages and we can therefore 
forget about the [PCISIR] proposal."® "The outbreak of war 
in Korea" they predicted, "can only serve to deepen the 
tensions which exist and the opportunities to play them for 
selfish purposes."® The staff did agree, however, that the 
war had improved their strategic political situation and 
that the White House should therefore launch an offensive. 
Murphy, Elsey and Spingarn warned Truman that the 
opportunity to take the initiative against the McCarthyites 
would end soon. "It seems to us that...the best time to set 
up...a [PCISIR] commission is while McCarthy and company are 
not on the front pages since at such a time it does not so 
much create the appearance that such action has been forced 
by Senator McCarthy and his charges.They reminded the 
president that they had warned him to take action in 1949, 
during a similar lull in the partisan battle over the issue. 
Since then, a lot of the administration's precious time had 
been spent on the problem. The issue of internal security, 
they warned, would come back again. Even if the Tydings' 
report were to pierce McCarthy's armor, an event which they 
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did not consider likely, someone would rise to take his 
place. 
Looking toward the upcoming release of the Tydings' 
report and beyond, Spingarn, Murphy, and Elsey clearly saw 
storm clouds gathering. These aides warned that if the 
Senate subcommittee failed to condemn McCarthy, the 
McCarthyites would control Congress. They pointed out that 
"even responsible people" like Senator Brian McMahon had 
endorsed the latest Senate investigation into government 
employment of sexual perverts. Most of all, the staff 
feared that the Republican right would coerce the upper 
chamber into passing more internal security legislation. On 
July 11, they alerted Truman to the fact that the Republican 
Policy Committee had put the Mundt-Nixon bill, a Republican-
sponsored anti-subversive initiative, on its "must list."^^ 
The bill would establish a Subversive Activities Control 
Board with jurisdiction over all Communist or "communist 
infiltrated" organizations.^^ To prevent the Republican 
initiative from gathering momentum, Spingarn and Murphy 
advised the president to announce the commission before the 
Tydings' investigation self-destructed.^^ 
Spingarn saw some hope for compromise. He informed his 
colleagues that Senator Magnussen intended to supplant the 
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Republican initiatives with his own bill. While the 
president's security expert called Magnussen's bill a 
"concentration camp" bill, and "probably worse than the 
Mundt-Nixon bill," Spingarn nevertheless thought the White 
House could use the Senator's help in defeating the 
Republican's bill.^^ If nothing else, he recommended that 
the White House help Magnussen draft a less odious bill. 
But the White House did not become deeply involved in 
planning a strategy with congressional allies, despite 
Magnussen's willingness to cooperate. Spingarn told the 
Magnussen's staff "to do some [research] before they 
legislated, rather than vice versa.The president made 
no grand gesture of working with Congress, and the events 
predicted by the White House aides came to pass. 
Deference to the tradition of wartime unity may have 
held McCarthy in check for a short time, but his connection 
of the war with domestic anti-communism was inevitable. 
While most of the GOP leadership waited until the wave of 
patriotism broke, McCarthy wasted little time. On July 12, 
he sent Truman a telegram. Korea, the Senator thundered, 
was "proof that this nation had been betrayed" by Acheson 
and the others who had sabotaged the loyalty program.^® 
McCarthy could have been worried that the Tydings report. 
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due to be released soon, would unmask him; thus, his 
quickness to use the Korean War as an issue might have been 
considered a preemptive political strike. If it was, it 
worked. 
Having garnered the front page with Korea, McCarthy 
claimed that the Tydings subcommittee had not examined the 
complete files. As proof, he cited a letter from J. Edgar 
Hoover to Senate investigators informing them that the FBI 
was in "no position to make statements concerning the 
completeness or incompleteness of the State Department 
files. It was a damaging charge, given Hoover's stature. 
The FBI director waited months before he confirmed the State 
Department's statement that the FBI had been given a 
complete copy of the files in dispute.^® In the meantime, 
McCarthy squabbled with the Tydings subcommittee and the 
State Department over the condition of the employee 
records. 
As the Tydings subcommittee concluded, it became clear 
that the Democrats had failed to work out a modus vivendi 
with the subcommittee's moderate Republican, Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge. The investigation divided along party lines 
when the Democratic members (Tydings, McMahon, and Greene) 
suggested drafting a working paper. Lodge and Hickenlooper 
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objected; they were not ready to issue a preliminary report. 
On July 17, the Democrats filed a majority report which 
accused McCarthy of perpetrating a "willful hoax." 
The report immediately sparked a bitter fight in the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the parent committee of 
the Tydings' investigation. The debate over the verdict 
became Democrat versus Republican, not subcommittee versus 
McCarthy.Senator Taft labeled the proceedings 
"political" and "insulting.Lodge and Hickenlooper filed 
a minority report that disputed the Democrats' conclusions. 
Senator Smith, and the others who had declared the tactics 
of McCarthy unconscionable just a month before, supported 
their Party.The majority report made it out of the 
parent committee on a straight party-line vote. It proved 
to be the last demonstration of Democratic Party unity on 
the issue of internal security till 1954.^^ 
McCarthy's efforts to defuse the investigation's report 
on the veracity of his charges were greatly enhanced by J. 
Edgar Hoover. The FBI Director's silence on the issue of 
the files, like the party line vote on the report, helped 
McCarthy create plausible doubts about the veracity and 
intent of the majority report. The story of the beleaguered 
subcommittee's majority report also shared the front page of 
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the New York Times with news of a new spy. Julius Rosenberg 
had been arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit 
espionage. The timing of the arrest reeked of foul play, 
but the White House dared not criticize the domain of J. 
Edgar Hoover. Shortly thereafter, Rosenberg's wife and a 
co-conspirator were arrested.^' 
Though Rosenberg had nothing to do with the present 
administration, the arrest of a man who had sold nuclear 
secrets to the Soviets muted the impact of the 
subcommittee's report.The conclusions of the Tydings 
subcommittee brought neither harm to McCarthy nor relief for 
the administration. A Gallup poll in July showed continued 
support for McCarthy.^® Thousands of letters poured into 
his office daily, as his reputation continued to increase 
into the fall of 1950.^"' The Rosenbergs remained in the 
public eye for a long time, serving as constant reminders of 
danger. Their presence certainly made it more difficult for 
Truman to convince Americans that there was no basis for 
McCarthy's charges. When asked about McCarthy in press 
conferences, he had "no comment."^® 
Spingarn refused to give up. In memo after memo, he 
pressed the case for immediate action. "I hate to be in the 
position of the boy who cried 'wolf too often," he wrote 
on July 20, but the failure of the Senate investigation had 
proven that "the eclipse of McCarthy is temporary."^® 
Seconded by Murphy, Spingarn outlined what he saw as the 
next contest with the McCarthyites, the congressional 
initiatives. Truman had publicly threatened to veto any 
version of the Mundt-Nixon Bill because its provisions were 
unconstitutional, pernicious, and unnecessary. His aides 
told him the veto, while courageous, would be extremely 
unpopular unless accompanied by dramatic executive action. 
Congress would override the veto unless the White House 
earned the nation's confidence. Truman's aides also warned 
that a "serious deterioration in the present international 
situation" might make it harder for him to lead Congress on 
the issue. Without positive gain in Korea, Spingarn even 
saw a "distinct possibility" that Magnussen's alternative 
bill would be subsumed by the Mundt-Nixon bill.^° 
The White House's opposition to the Republican bills 
was motivated at least in part by the desire to protect the 
Bill of Rights from the ravages of the Red Scare. The 
president and his staff recognized that the congressional 
initiatives, most notably the Mundt-Nixon bill, represented 
drastic and often unconstitutional measures to strengthen 
the war against domestic subversives. But concern for civil 
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liberties did not provoke the White House to address the 
dangerous extremism within the theory and practice of the 
Cold War. In short, Truman and his staff opposed the 
Subversive Activities Control Board without conceding its 
similarity to the loyalty program. Given that the operative 
principles were the same, the White House's opposition was 
inconsistent.^^ More important, it was not credible. 
Even while he continued to push for a presidential 
investigation into internal security as a way to forestall 
the Congress, Spingarn came up with alternatives. He 
encouraged the president to issue a message to Congress 
discussing the whole question and reiterating the need for 
balance. The proposed message would stress that the 
nation already had effective laws, such as the Smith Act. 
Spingarn also floated the idea of presidential support for 
some "decent" laws in order to defeat the worst of the 
bills; in other words, to work with Magnussen. Truman's 
advisors clearly understood that passage of Mundt-Nixon or 
other Republican bills would be perceived as another victory 
of the Republican right. 
Murphy and Spingarn made an effort to prevent other 
congressional investigations into internal security from 
embroiling themselves in the loyalty files issue. They 
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also attempted to protect civil liberties by bridling the 
zealous Justice Department. Armed with a letter from 
Truman, Spingarn extracted from Attorney General McGrath a 
promise to withdraw his department's support for the Hobbes 
Bill, a bill designed to strengthen the government's ability 
to deport suspected communists.'' But McGrath, like J. 
Edgar Hoover, continued to support this and other anti-
Communist legislation.^^ The Hobbes bill passed in mid 
July. In the last hours, several congressmen complained 
that they were unaware that the administration opposed the 
bill.^® Spingarn blamed the Attorney General.^'' 
Later that month, the President met with his domestic 
policy team to discuss the public's concern with internal 
security. Murphy asked for guidance on the upcoming bills. 
"The president said," according to one observer, "that the 
situation in this respect was the worst it had been since 
the Alien and Sedition acts of 1798, that a lot of people on 
the Hill should know better but had been stampeded into 
running with their tails between their legs."^® Truman 
reiterated his commitment to the Bill of Rights, and his 
intention to veto the legislation. Having taken what he 
considered the high road, the president approved his staff's 
suggestion that a presidential message to Congress be 
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drafted "as a basis for further discussion."^® Over the 
next few days, Truman relented somewhat, as Spingarn pressed 
his case for executive action among the president's most 
trusted advisors.^® Under pressure from his staff and a 
number of Senators to defeat the Republican legislative 
agenda by creating a commission, Truman promised to study 
Spingarn's most recent memorandum." 
The draft of the Presidential message, prepared by 
Spingarn with help from the entire staff on July 23, 
revealed that the White House's appraisal of the problem had 
not altered, even if its members disagreed on solutions. 
It all began with the threat. The national commitment to 
containment protected the U.S. and other free nations from 
the horrors of communist totalitarianism, which were 
described in graphic detail. President Truman, however, 
would protect America's internal security in a manner 
consistent with the Bill of Rights. The draft defended the 
loyalty program for its balancing security of civil 
liberties, though it conceded the need for mild reforms. 
The draft message then condemned those who sought to "enact 
a new set of Alien and Sedition laws." Moreover, it blamed 
the "super patriots and the seekers of partisan or selfish 
advantage" for playing on the people's fears. To combat 
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such pernicious influences, the president would establish a 
Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights would 
be established.^^ 
Truman sent Congress his message on internal security 
on August 8th. He proposed moderate reforms in his loyalty 
program and the federal law, but he did not concede much. 
Praising his record, he cited the number of communists that 
had been convicted and even took credit for the new powers 
accorded McGrath by immigration law—an act Truman had asked 
McGrath to oppose.Then he defended his opposition to the 
Mundt-Nixon bill (which had become known as the McCarran 
bill), using many of the themes he had used against 
McCarthy. Now, however, Truman was criticizing a proposal 
popular in Congress. Sponsorship of the Republican Mundt-
Nixon bill had been taken over by a powerful Democrat in the 
Senate, Pat McCarran of Nevada. 
Truman had chosen to accuse Republicans, not Democrats, 
of endangering the nation with their wild charges, and their 
"sedition bills. The McCarran bill would harm not only 
civil liberties, he predicted,, but would also help 
communists agents in the country. Truman's explanation of 
how his opponent's bill would help communists was rather 
complicated, but the intent of the criticism was obvious. 
Truman still hoped to establish himself as the pre-eminent 
anti-communist. He did not mention the presidential 
commission in his message; the reason was never recorded. 
Truman's message to Congress amounted to branding all 
of his critics as McCarthyites. It was a mistake for Truman 
to set himself against the public's desire for more 
investigations and the Congress's concomitant desire to 
participate in the most powerful issue of the day. Without 
a clear distinction between its anti-communism and that of 
McCarthy, the White House's opposition to congressional 
initiatives must have appeared to the public as the fruit of 
bitter partisanship, not concern for national well-being. 
Truman's low popularity, along with the lack of a clear 
victory in Korea, made a majority in Congress refuse to 
endorse Truman's anti-communism. As it developed, the 
Democrats in Congress, not the vocal Republican right, 
threatened to hand the president a serious defeat. Judging 
by his message to Congress, then, Truman considered the 
battle against McCarthy as a better arena in which to 
restore his reputation than the alternative of dealing with 
the abuses of civil liberties by his own party. He failed 
to appreciate, however, that labeling a mass desertion of 
his own party as McCarthyism left him no room to maneuver. 
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Though the president continued to proclaim that he was 
"not alarmed by the recent anti-communist hysteria," he 
recognized that he needed to prove something.^® Truman and 
his staff lobbied hard in August and September, distributing 
copies of "Witch Hunting and Hysteria in the United States" 
to the Democratic National Committee and its congressional 
candidates, as well as to selected journalists, 
commentators, and editors.^'' While his staff used the study 
to prepare speeches, the president himself sent copies 
directly to prominent Democrats and the editor of the New 
York Times. "The Republicans," Truman added in a covering 
letter, "have usually profited by these waves of hysteria at 
the time, but have lost in the long run...this stage we are 
in now is of Republican manufacture and it will burn 
surely." As for the McCarthyites, he told one reporter, 
they were "beneath contempt."''® 
Truman also replaced Lowenthal with Murphy and Spingarn 
as his primary congressional liaison on the issue. The 
replacement of Max Lowenthal, whose criticism of J. Edgar 
Hoover's application of anti-communism amounted to a 
criticism of Truman's own, signaled the president's 
commitment to anti-communism and his lack of concern for 
civil liberties. Spingarn and Murphy dutifully contacted. 
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among others, the staff of the Senate Democratic Policy 
Committee and colleagues at the State Department in order to 
draft bills that represented the kinds of reforms outlined 
in the presidential message. Given that the purpose of 
drafting the bill was to defeat a measure popular in 
Congress, however, the "reforms" of the internal security 
laws involved strengthening them.^^ Truman thought he could 
win by being a stronger anti-communist than his opponents. 
Spingarn even wrote to the J. Edgar Hoover, decrying the 
"unholy mess." "Needless to say," he added, "a statement by 
you [Hoover] in support of [the Democratic initiative]... 
would carry great weight.Apparently, the request fell 
on deaf ears. Not inclined to do Truman any favors. Hoover 
continued to issue dire warnings about communism and 
subversion. 
Anti-communist hysteria continued to grow in August and 
September, months which witnessed highly publicized 
investigations into Hollywood and the broadcasting industry. 
The clamor for more internal security legislation continued 
unabated. Attorney General McGrath designated more 
organizations as communist.^'' The Loyalty Review Board told 
its agency heads to "adjudicate cases faster" because there 
were more on the way.^^ Communists continued to be 
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arrested, arraigned, tried and convicted. Rather than 
challenge the president directly, the McCarthyites instead 
chose to level their most outrageous accusations at the 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. As Acheson's popularity 
plummeted, Truman felt compelled to proclaim that he would 
not fire his secretary of state.®® To his wife, the 
president admitted that he had to fire the Secretary of 
Defense, Louis Johnson, partly because Johnson had 
"intrigued in scandalous fashion against" Acheson by passing 
administration secrets to the McCarthyites.®^ Truman also 
let Acheson know that the Secretary of State could "fire 
anyone" he mistrusted—though he did not specify whether he 
meant suspected communists or suspected McCarthyites.®® 
Standing firm against the hysteria, the president also 
reiterated his promise to veto the impending congressional 
action.®® Warnings that the situation required action, not 
intransigence, came to Truman from many sources. Early in 
September, Senator Magnussen and other allies of the 
administration in Congress sponsored a bill in an attempt to 
supplant the McCarran Act. Following the old adage that 
"you can't beat something with nothing," Spingarn advised 
the president to support the efforts of Democrats on the 
Hill.®° On the other hand, a few moderate Republicans told 
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top White House advisors privately that a presidential 
commission might be enough to block the McCarran bill.®^ On 
September 19 Spingarn recorded that, after being told of 
Senate support for the proposed panel, the president "was 
favorably disposed...if it would help sustain the 
[ impending ] veto. " 
The president's nod of approval forced his staff to re­
examine the PCISIR proposal. In mid-September, 
Administrative Assistant David Bell wrote Murphy about 
preparations for the PCISIR.®^ He informed Murphy that the 
original plan was now "obsolete." The reporting date of the 
proposed panel needed adjustment. The current plan, which 
specified July or August of 1951, might well "cramp the 
commission for time." On the other hand, if the commission 
reported in late November or December of 1951, the 
commission could well "become a political issue for the 1952 
campaign." While the report might help the Democrats, "the 
pitch of the draft statement (and I believe the correct 
pitch) is taking this stuff out of politics."®^ To avoid 
making the PCISIR a political ploy. Bell advised immediate 
action. Concerned about the panel's chances for success, he 
also floated the idea of appointing J. Edgar Hoover to it. 
The hour of the congressional vote on the McCarran 
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(Mundt-Nixon) Bill drew near. The bill appeared certain to 
pass. Instead of unilaterally announcing a presidential 
panel, Truman decided to take a half-step. He backed the 
anti-conununist bill presented by his allies in the Senate, 
the Magnussen bill.®^ In so doing, he went from opposing 
all congressional action to favoring that sponsored by his 
allies. The position lacked credibility because of its 
obvious partisanship. The flip-flop also contradicted his 
prior insistence that current laws and procedures met the 
challenge. The White House was in an untenable situation. 
As historian Athan Theoharris surmised, Truman could not 
simultaneously contend that the nation was in danger and 
oppose the McCarran Act."®® 
The passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950, known 
as the McCarran Act, cost the president a great deal of 
political clout. Leading Congressional Democrats had not 
done much to block its passage and advised the president to 
sign it." Truman refused to sign what he deemed a 
"draconian" law, citing his commitment to the Constitution. 
On September 22, Congress overrode his veto. Compounding 
the injury, the bill sponsored by Magnussen had been 
subsumed into the McCarran Act. Congress' reassertion of 
influence in the debate over domestic security was, as 
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historian Alonzo Hamby concluded, considered by most 
contemporaries as an important victory for the opponents of 
the administration.®® 
One challenge yet remained in 1950, the congressional 
elections of 1950. "The people," Truman predicted, 
"understand the Republican approach to the election and they 
are not going to be fooled."®® In other words, Truman hoped 
that the people would force Congress to behave. 
Administrative Assistant David Lloyd set out the 
campaign themes of 1950 in an effort to guide the Party's 
national committee. While they amounted to little more than 
new variations on old themes, his suggestions were 
implemented nonetheless. "The political objective," as 
defined by Lloyd, was "to drive the isolationists out of 
Congress—an objective which for the most part, with only a 
few exceptions—would drive out the chief opponents of our 
domestic program as well." He recommended handling "the Red 
Scare by pointing out the political objectives of the ring 
leaders of the smear campaign, [and] tying this in with the 
attack on our bipartisan foreign policy." Lloyd argued that 
making isolationism the main issue "would take the 
administration out of a defensive position." "Better to 
attack isolationists," he concluded, "than Republicans."''" 
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Just as Lloyd expected, the Republican Party's election 
platform in 1950 emphasized the war against communism, 
though of course they framed it differently. The GOP made 
the most of the administration's ineffectiveness in handling 
the war in Korea and the battle against domestic 
subversion.'^- McCarthy maintained a high profile during the 
election, making over thirty major speeches in fifteen 
states. The Senator drew large, enthusiastic crowds. As 
usual, he distilled Republican themes into their crudest 
essence. He blamed the war in Korea on "the Kremlin and 
those who sabotaged rearming, including Acheson and the 
president, if you please. 
The accusation that he had held back militarily in 
Korea was one criticism Truman thought he could fix. A 
scant week before the election, the president met with 
General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of US forces in 
Korea, at Wake Island. The White House steadfastly 
maintained that the visit was a military necessity, and 
therefore not intended to inspire positive headlines. 
While on Wake, Truman assented to General MacArthur's demand 
that he be allowed to carry the fight to the communists 
across the 38th parallel on September 29. Moving beyond 
containment in Korea was a popular idea, but one fraught 
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with peril. The Chinese government had stated that a United 
Nations takeover of North Korea was unacceptable. At home, 
the prospect of total victory raised public expectations. 
The White House certainly had congressional support to take 
the step."*^ But then, Truman had not asked for it. 
With the nation engaged in a war, the president limited 
himself to one major campaign address, televised on November 
4.'^® While continuing to warn of the threat the Soviets 
posed to the United States, Truman announced that "the 
coming victory in Korea would be the greatest step toward 
peace in my lifetime.^® Again he reviewed the record to 
support his contention that his administration had done more 
than his opponents to defeat the communists. To underscore 
the bipartisan nature of his foreign policy, he pointed to 
the fact that Republicans held important posts in the State 
Department and the Loyalty Program. At which point a member 
of the audience called out "Give'em hell, Harry!" "I'm 
going to," Truman replied.''^ 
Truman's speech expanded the ranks of the McCarthyites 
to include all Republicans. The GOP had opposed "every 
great progressive measure... in the last 17 years." They 
were isolationists playing partisan politics, and they had 
to be stopped. Realizing that the charge of isolationism 
might not stick to a Party hell-bent on the war against 
communism, Truman appealed to the same sense of national 
crisis that his opponents used. The crazy lies of the 
McCarthyites, who claimed the Democrats were soft on 
communism, endangered the nation by weakening national 
unity. In his own words, "the Republicans... had been 
willing...to undermine their own government at a time of 
great international peril," by manipulating the communist 
issue beyond "all sense of proportion, all sense of 
restraint, all sense of patriotic decency."''® He concluded 
by predicting that the nation would not be fooled by their 
"mudslinging." 
Events in Korea did not strengthen Truman's position. 
The Chinese entered the war and, as the election approached, 
the United Nations forces in Korea were beaten back once 
again.''® Despite the administration's troubles, the 
Democratic Party held on to its majority in both houses. 
According to the post-election analysis of Kenneth 
Hechler, the Chinese victories just before the election 
"made it look like the onset of WWIII," which frightened 
voters into accepting "the scapegoat suggested by McCarthy 
and his smear crew."®° Hechler, like most politicians and 
political commentators, attributed a great deal of electoral 
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influence to McCarthy and the "ism" that bore his name.®^ 
The Wisconsin Senator's reputation had been enhanced by the 
defeat of Senators Millard Tydings in Maryland and Scott 
Lucas in Illinois. McCarthy had singled out these two 
Democratic senators as his main enemies during the election, 
and had campaigned on behalf of their Republican opponents. 
The "spectacular nature of those Senate contests," Hechler 
noted, "overshadowed the real progress which the Democratic 
Party made in 1950."®^ Breaking down the returns state by 
state, Hechler highlighted the Democratic victories won in 
the face of "vicious smear campaigns." More important, he 
recognized that other problems, such as divisions within 
statewide Democratic organizations, had been "as important 
as the smear campaign."®^ Historians have confirmed and 
deepened Hechler's suspicions about the meaning of the 
election results; Richard Fried considered Senator McCarthy 
"a master at nothing so much as identifying himself with the 
political dividends."®^ Hechler did not see what Fried 
later would. The president's personal historian concluded 
that "unquestionably, the returns in many 
areas... represented a temporary triumph for the tactics of 
the smear campaign."®^ 
Hechler's analysis confirmed the president's own 
92 
assessment, that the election represented a victory for 
McCarthy. Truman blamed himself for not hitting McCarthy 
hard enough.®® He also blamed Democratic candidates for 
lacking "the nerve to fight fire with fire." "In the states 
where the [Democrats'] majority was increased in the off-
year, " the president complained, "the candidates supported 
the Democratic program and called McCarthy what he is—a 
liar and a crook."®'' The fact, however, that 
"McCarthyism...seemed to have an effect on the voter" 
greatly depressed Truman, and he drank heavily the night the 
returns came in.®® 
In late November, the Chinese army broke through UN 
lines, and the situation grew desperate. Truman exacerbated 
the tense crisis by intimating in a press conference that 
the atomic bomb might be used.®® Behind closed doors, the 
president contemplated the effect of sending more soldiers 
to South Korea would have on his political fortunes at a 
staff meeting on December 28. Increasing the military 
commitment meant a message to Congress, perhaps a 
declaration of national emergency. Worst of all, Truman 
knew that the entry of China into the war would force him to 
renounce publicly the idea of liberating North Korea. 
Realizing that the limitation would be unpopular, he lashed 
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out, accusing the McCarthyites of encouraging the Eastern 
Bloc to be more aggressive. The remark betrayed Truman's 
fury at the prospect of McCarthy's reaction to limited war 
aims. 
Truman understood how the war in Korea, along with the 
election and the McCarran Act, had led to his downfall, but 
not why. The main reason these events had hurt him so 
badly was that 
he had framed each of these events as if it were part of a 
contest between himself and McCarthy. Truman had declared 
that those who criticized his handling of the Korean war 
were McCarthyites. He had declared that those who supported 
the McCarran Act were McCarthyites. He had characterized 
the congressional elections of 1950 as a referendum on the 
McCarthyites. And he blamed his political problems, which 
by December of 1950 were large, on McCarthyism, a blend of 
unscrupulous politician and a hysterical public. 
But McCarthyism was not some mystical force. He had 
made war unilaterally; he suffered the consequences of Korea 
alone. The Rosenberg Case had also injured the president's 
credibility because Truman, after helping to engineer the 
Red Scare, had insisted the McCarthy was a liar—there were 
no communists in government. Given Truman's ineffective 
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leadership on the issue of anti-communism. Congress choose 
to get involved and the voters gave at least some credence 
to Republican red-baiters during the election. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Nostrum 
After a year filled with bitter defeat, Truman spent 
most of 1951 trying to create a vehicle to do what he damned 
the McCarthyites for doing--using the Cold War hysteria for 
political gain. In January, he established the President's 
Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. He 
created it, he said, to examine the government's domestic 
security programs in a non-partisan atmosphere and so strike 
a balance between the imperatives of national security and 
civil liberty. Neither the public, the media, nor Congress 
responded with enthusiasm, however. Truman's attempt to 
establish a commission could only be considered an attempt 
to re-establish his credibility at the expense of his 
critics. And so it was. During the past year, the 
objectives of the PCISIR had degenerated along with the 
president's fortunes, even as its license had been cheapened 
by half-steps. When Congress blocked the initiative, Truman 
revised the loyalty and security program by executive order. 
The new standard of disloyalty directed the administrators 
of the loyalty program to use as extreme a definition of 
disloyalty as that put forth by McCarthy. The new standard, 
like the PCISIR, was an attempt to sacrifice civil liberties 
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in order to inoculate the administration against further 
criticism. Truman spent 1951 trying to beat McCarthy using 
McCarthyism, and it led to his ruin. 
First raised in 1948 by civil libertarians within the 
administration concerned by Truman's loyalty program, the 
concept of a presidential commission had been considered by 
the White House staff at various times in the summer and 
fall of 1949.^ The interest of then Special Council Clark 
Clifford and his staff, which included Murphy, Elsey, and 
Spingarn, had been prompted by alarming trends in the 
nation.^ There had been scattered, spontaneous outbursts of 
anti-communism and patriotism from the general public. In 
the Senate, conservative Republicans had begun to 
extrapolate a new form of criticism from Truman's anti-
communism. Representative Richard Nixon and others on the 
House UnAmerican Activities Committee, meanwhile, had earned 
acclaim for leading the investigation of Alger Hiss. In his 
assessment of the developing situation, Spingarn noted that 
a review of policy might protect the president's loyalty 
program from attack, either from those concerned with civil 
liberties, or those concerned with internal security.^ 
As late as January, 1950, a presidential panel had been 
recommended by Murphy, Elsey, Spingarn and Donald Dawson of 
the White House, as well as Secretary of Defense Frank Pace 
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and Admiral Souers of the National Security Council. They 
supported the panel idea because it was time for a 
reassessment of the government's loyalty and security 
apparatus. All current government employees had been 
checked. The loyalty boards of the various agencies would 
soon be checking applicants and "such new loyalty charges as 
may be leveled against incumbents already cleared."" In 
addition, the Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, Seth 
Richardson, had requested that the White House give the 
program permanent legal status.^ 
The White House staff had also intended the panel to 
provide better guidelines to Richardson and the 
administrators of the loyalty program. Charles Murphy, then 
an Administrative Assistant, had alerted the president to 
the fact that the "sensitive agencies" (the Department of 
Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, State Department and 
Central Intelligence Agency), were dismissing employees for 
security rather than loyalty grounds.® Disloyalty, the 
agency heads had told Murphy, was too hard to prove. Murphy 
had requested that the proposed commission examine this 
practice.^ 
The request amounted to an attempt to distinguish 
between security risks--employees whose personal habits or 
lifestyle left them open to blackmail by communists, and 
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loyalty risks—those who were susceptible to the 
machinations of communists because of their beliefs. Had it 
been acted upon. Murphy's request for an codification of the 
loyalty standard might have alerted Truman to the enormous 
confusion created by attempts to define disloyalty. On the 
other hand, the proposal might also have led to a more 
intense anti-civil libertarian policy. Regardless of where 
the PCISIR came down on the question of disloyalty, however, 
the development of a clear standard might have saved the 
administration from the worst abuses of McCarthy by removing 
the confusion within which he thrived. But no action was 
taken. A few weeks later McCarthy appeared, and the matter 
of internal security became the purview of the Tydings' 
investigation. 
It only took a month of watching Tydings for the some 
on the staff to renew their recommendation for a proactive 
policy. The situation looked grim. Truman had tried to 
help Tydings by announcing that the Loyalty Review Board 
would investigate the disputed cases. Though the 
president's LRB initiative had no effect on the controversy, 
Murphy and Spingarn still had high hopes for the PCISIR 
proposal. They advised Truman to help himself by taking 
action.® Though still couched in terms of balancing 
security with liberty, the proposed PCISIR had already been 
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directed toward the new threat: the failure of the Tydings 
committee. Truman choose instead to release the files to the 
subcommittee. Murphy and Spingarn again waited a few weeks 
to ascertain the effect of the files. In late May, they 
renewed their support for a panel.® 
At this point, their colleague. Administrative 
Assistant Don Dawson, raised some concerns about the 
proposal he had once supported. The situation had changed, 
he argued, because McCarthy had sown so much doubt and 
confusion. 
Taking Dawson's concerns into consideration. Murphy and 
Spingarn sought to broker a deal with the Tydings 
subcommittee that would give the PCISIR full 
accreditation.^® If the members of the subcommittee would 
"cease firing while the Richardson board completes its 
consideration of these cases," the White House would direct 
the LRB to finish its examination of the complete files of 
those state department employees still under attack, and 
report its finding directly to the Tydings subcommittee. 
The members of the subcommittee would then submit a interim 
report stating "that the subcommittee has examined the files 
sufficiently to determine that they are the same loyalty 
files which were furnished several congressional commissions 
during the Republican 80th Congress and that those 
106 
commissions did not find any basis for action at that 
time."^^ The subcommittee's interim report would then be 
taken up by the president's appointees. Murphy and 
Spingarn's effort to write the subcommittee's report 
amounted to a request that the Republicans on the Tydings 
subcommittee abdicate their authority over the issue of 
internal security in favor of Truman. The White House 
operated on the assumption that curbing the excesses of the 
anti-communist hysteria and re-establishing Truman's 
leadership of the Cold War just happened to be one and the 
same. Senators Lodge and Hickenlooper, however, refused to 
abandon their influence in the most powerful issue of the 
day. Their refusal to abdicate authority was a portent not 
fully appreciated by the White House. 
By spring, the Democratic members of the subcommittee 
had become ardent supporters of presidential action. 
Threatened by McCarthy's success at making them look inept. 
Senator's Tydings and McMahon defined the panel as an 
investigation of the State Department and the loyalty 
program.Spingarn, however, rejected their narrow 
approach. As far as he and Murphy were concerned, the 
intent of PCISIR remained to provide a more general relief 
from the hysteria.^'' Distinguished citizens "of the elder 
statesman variety" would be appointed to a committee led by 
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a prominent Republican. They would be charged with the 
task of determining the procedures needed to protect 
national security while safeguarding civil liberties. Their 
purview, therefore, should contain not only review of 
government's loyalty and security programs, but also the 
formulation of a "national policy with respect to internal 
security legislation."^® Only a committee of distinguished 
citizens from both parties, argued the president's advisors, 
could sufficiently command the trust of the people to settle 
the issue. 
The White House staff's proposal recognized that elder 
statesmen untainted by the controversy could achieve what 
the White House had not—a clear definition of words like 
"loyalty," and "communist." Truman's aides were also 
certain that such a committee would not endorse McCarthy's 
definitions. The problem unstated in Murphy's and 
Spingarn's assessment was that many government employees 
had committed various political indiscretions in their 
youth. The solution they offered addressed this by having a 
few trusted individuals convince the public that almost all 
of these past associations were harmless. 
Of course the immediate political benefits of the 
PCISIR were not lost on men burdened by the practical 
realities of running the country. In early summer of 1950, 
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the staff's biggest concerns were Republican congressional 
initiatives, particularly "the current version of the Mundt-
Nixon bill," and the upcoming congressional elections." 
The staff proposed the PCISIR be instructed to issue an 
interim report by October, 1950--just before the 
congressional elections.-^" 
The sudden start of a shooting war against foreign 
communists strengthened the staff's commitment to the idea. 
The war represented a perfect pretext for establishing a 
PCISIR; it had not only served "to deepen the tensions which 
exist," the war would also silence the McCarthyites for at 
least a short period." Establishing a panel, therefore, 
would be considered by the public as the act of a strong 
leader who had the interests of the nation at heart, not as 
a partisan maneuver against McCarthy.^® Spingarn and 
Murphy, in short, encouraged Truman to use the Korea war as 
a means of beating the McCarthyites. 
The staff was not so foolhardy as to expect the panel 
simply to validate administration policy.Concerned about 
the effect of the war, they urged the president to endow the 
panel with unrestricted access and to resist attempts to 
confine the investigation "behind the bars of 'secrecy,' 
'security,' and 'administrative (or legal) 
embarrassment.'"^^ They believed that the administration 
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had to accept some criticism, but that the concession would 
be worthwhile if it lead to a more cautious debate, as well 
as a widespread understanding that the loyalty program could 
never be infallible. 
By mid-summer, then, Spingarn and Murphy and Elsey had 
fully articulated both their perception of McCarthyism and 
their answer to it. Both perception and answer were shaped 
by contempt for McCarthyism, and a commitment to anti-
communism. They believed that re-establishing the president 
as the nation's preeminent anti-communist and reigning in 
McCarthyism were one and the same thing. The various 
incarnations of their proposals, therefore, had always aimed 
at getting a duly-authorized, credible organization to 
expose McCarthy and demonstrate "responsible" anti-
communism. Murphy and Spingarn's strategy was flawed 
because, during these past few months, the White House 
itself had helped transform the Cold War consensus into 
McCarthyism. Their appreciation of the forces producing 
McCarthyism lacked one essential element: a recognition of 
the administration's culpability for the creation of an 
ideology so imbued with extremism. 
The lack of recognition prevented the White House from 
offering a clear, practical distinction between the 
administration's anti-comjnunism and that of McCarthy. While 
putting the finishing touches of the PCISIR proposal in the 
sunomer of 1950, Spingarn explicitly rejected one columnist's 
suggestion that the committee examine the whole question of 
internal security. In his words, he did not want a charter 
so broad that the cases are "lost in a corner.In short, 
the distinguished citizens on the panel would not be asked 
to fundamentally reassess the nature of the communist 
threat. For the administration, the logic was elementary. 
The nature of the communist threat required the utmost 
vigilance. Beyond that, maintaining anti-communist fervor 
within the nation was critical to the stability of US 
foreign policy. The fundamentals represented, however, a 
slippery slope. Truman and his staff slipped, condemning 
the hysteria—which they blamed on the Republican right— 
without recognizing the role that the Truman Doctrine and 
the loyalty program had in generating these fears. 
Privately, at least, Truman and his top aides condemned 
the zealotry of the administrators of the nation's domestic 
security apparatus. Spingarn, Murphy, and Elsey had long 
considered the FBI Director one of "those who seek careers 
by persecuting others."^'' Hoover, however, was hardly the 
only member of the administration who had demonstrated 
extremism. The staff's memo's from the summer of 1950, 
replete with oblique condemnations of "those who confuse the 
public as to the nature and size of the problem," suggested 
that they placed some blame upon other members of the 
domestic security bureaucracy.^^ In other words, the 
extreme anti-communism practiced by the Attorney General, 
the Chairman of the LRB, as well as National Security 
Advisor Sidney Sours had come to the White House's 
attention.^® The private condemnations of extreme cold 
warriors within the administration lacked any appreciation 
of the fact that Richardson and the other administrators of 
the loyalty program operated under presidential directives. 
By the end of 1950, the White House's public 
condemnation of those who confused liberals with communists 
approached hyperbole. As he developed the PCISIR in light 
of the off-year election results, Spingarn asked J. Edgar 
Hoover, "as a leading expert in the field,...go on 
record...[instead of] "staying in the background when the 
going gets tough. Hoover was approached despite his 
reactionary view of security and his animosity toward the 
administration.^® The suggestion that Hoover's cooperation 
be solicited pointed up the White Houses' abandonment of 
principle for the sake of political position. The PCISIR 
had become an act of vengeance upon the Republican Party. 
Soon after the election. Murphy gave the president another 
detailed memorandum on the PCISIR proposal.^® This memo did 
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not mention the goal of the panel striking a balance between 
liberty and security. Instead, Truman's top White House 
domestic advisor assumed that exposing Republican deceit and 
reducing public hysteria were one and the same. 
He began by conceding that the elections left the White 
House in a weak position. More important, the GOP certainly 
considered it an effective issue, and therefore could be 
"expected to play it very hard for the next two years. 
It was thus necessary to "effectively counter-act such 
political charges." Because the PCISIR proposal could not 
be attacked as partisan, he continued, "its judgement would 
carry great public weight and be a firm reliance for 
Democratic candidates in '52." Murphy emphasized that the 
panel should be created before Congress reconvened. While 
conceding that such unilateral action would not silence 
Republican criticisms, he claimed it would effectively 
answer them. As he saw it, the nation supported the 
government's security program, but McCarthyism had made them 
uneasy. A panel "designed to give them the truth," he 
promised, would be considered "a statesman-like step." "The 
real truth of the matter," Special Council declared, was 
that "the appointment and reports of such a commission will 
help to show up the Republicans as unpatriotic politicians, 
ready to undermine their governm.ent to gain votes... 
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Murphy also listed several important White House 
political objectives that would be achieved by such action. 
"The findings of the commission would undoubtedly strongly 
endorse the effectiveness of the President's loyalty 
program." Not only would the proposal deflate any new 
Republican investigations, the commission. Murphy promised, 
it "would be bound to recommend repeal or substantial 
overhaul of the McCarran Act.""^^ 
Presidential Assistant David Bell concurred with 
Murphy's assessment. He and David Lloyd, Richard Neustadt 
and Donald Hansen had become actively involved in the issue 
with the abrupt removal of Stephen Spingarn who, as Murphy 
later wrote, "just couldn't keep his mouth shut."^^ Bell's 
memorandum to the president, also of November 14, 
illustrated the extent of the White House's self-serving 
confusion. Bell fumed that "internal security had been 
injected into partisan politics, where it had no place," 
even as he and Murphy worked out a way to use the PCISIR to 
their political advantage.^'' 
As November wore on, the White House staff chose likely 
candidates for their proposed commission. Truman, 
however, remained reluctant to take an action. Pressed by 
Murphy and Chief of Staff Matt Connally at a staff meeting 
on November 20, "the president expressed opposition to [the 
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PCISIR proposal] as he felt it would be an admission that 
the government's program is wrong and that, he said, he 
could not concede,"^® Instead, the president indicated a 
willingness to "deliver a radio address, covering the whole 
thing and pointing out the lies that have been told about 
it." Only a few days later, however, Truman realized the 
futility of more speeches and began searching for a 
moderate, respected Republican to lead his commission. 
Truman wrote Herbert Hoover on November 25, 1950, 
outlining his proposal and requesting the former president 
chair the commission.^"' Truman's staff made sure the letter 
contained nothing that the Republicans could use.^® Hoover 
refused the next day. Truman appealed to the former 
president again.Hoover advised Truman to allow congress 
full access to the files, so that they might do a complete 
examination. The president, however, was in no mood to 
follow this advice. 
Truman wrote in his diary at the end of November, 
lamenting the fact that the new Congress had "more morons 
than patriots in it."''° He considered those Senators, 
whether from the Republican right or the Southern Democrats, 
who opposed his ambitious foreign policy as 
"Stalin's... helpers," though none could be as useful to the 
Soviet President as McCarthy. Truman regarded his problems 
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as unique in American history: 
I suppose that presidents in the past have had a 
hostile congress—but they were frankly of the 
opposition. This one—the 81st—happens to be of 
my own party on the surface... There are liars, 
trimmers, and pussyfooters on both sides of the 
aisle in the Senate and the House. I'm sorry. I 
wish I had straight out opposition and loyal 
support. I guess its too much to ask for."^ 
As for McCarthy, he was still creating a storm, albeit 
as much legal as legislative. During the course of the next 
two years, he was in court either suing or being sued for 
libel, all while under investigation by the Senate for his 
actions during the congressional elections of 1950. Despite 
generating a great deal of derogatory information about the 
senator, the various initiatives aimed at McCarthy produced 
more months of partisan bickering but no clear resolution.''^ 
After all, the last few months had left him in a strong 
situation, so politicians felt some trepidation about taking 
him on and little necessity to back Truman. 
National politics remained bitter in December of 1950 
and January of 1951 as McCarthyism gathered momentum. 
Senate conformation of the administration's nomination of 
Anna Rosenberg to the Defense Department stalled because of 
the baseless accusations by the Republican right. The 
President had her file sent over to Senate, congressional 
investigators did their homework, and her accusers were 
defeated.''^ The McCarthyites simply readjusted the battle 
lines, demanding the development of closer ties to Chang Kai 
Chek and the dismissal of Secretary of State Acheson. A 
Gallup poll showed Americans held a low opinion of the 
Secretary of State.Truman defended him, proclaiming that 
if the "enemies of liberty and Christianity" were to take 
over the country the next day, Acheson would be "one of the 
first, if not the first, to be shot."^^ In defiance of 
Truman, the new Congress debated U.S. foreign policy, 
especially the Korean War. Reverses in Korea compelled the 
President to declare a State of Emergency. In his State of 
the Union Address, the President once again sounded the 
alarm against the Soviet menace and once again sought to 
rally the people to his banner. But his popularity 
continued to fall.''® 
Near the end of January, Truman announced the creation 
of a Presidential Commission on Internal Security and 
Individual Rights (PCISIR). Admiral Chester A. Nimitz 
chaired the select panel of citizens from various sectors of 
society.'''' Their task was to review all existing loyalty 
and security policies, and suggest ways of improving the 
program's balance of security and liberty.^® Truman also 
said that he intended the panel to remove the issue of 
internal security from partisan politics.''® In the weeks 
following the announcement, his staff made an effort to 
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ensure that "the Nimitz Commission and the White House...be 
divorced in every possible way."^° Years later, Truman 
contended that he had made it "clear that [he] would not 
stand for the intrusion of partisan politics. 
The White House's claim of non-partisanship was as 
disingenuous, however, as its tone of outraged moralism. In 
his press conference on the PCISIR, Truman repeated his 
assertion that the Republicans were damaging the national 
interest by politicizing the issue of internal security. 
The president then delineated the parameters of internal 
security as though security hinged upon the loyalty of every 
one of the government's over two million employees—placing 
forest rangers and post men on the same level as policy 
analysts and diplomats. Inherent in the Nimitz 
commission's license, then, was an overestimation of the 
problem of subversion. In granting the license, the 
president intended to enervate criticism by demonstrating 
his anti-communism. Instead, the mandate created another 
host for the germs of McCarthyism. McCarthy and his cohorts 
responded in predictable fashion to this challenge, 
redoubling their assault on the administration's anti-
subversion program. 
The McCarthyites' incessant attacks upon the nation's 
internal security policy, along with Truman's admission that 
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his program needed revision, produced a chain of events 
disastrous for the White House. Truman's attempt to use the 
PCISIR to demonstrate his steadfast anti-communism by 
strengthening the government's program placed a great deal 
of pressure upon the loyalty program's top administrator, 
the Republican Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, Hiriam 
Bingham. Bingham, after serving the state of Connecticut as 
both senator and governor, had succeeded Seth Richardson as 
the chairman of the LRB in early 1951. As early as 1949, 
Richardson had requested that a new loyalty standard be 
adopted. Bingham, surely alarmed at prospect of being 
criticized by the PCISIR, renewed the request. Presidential 
authorization of a more stringent loyalty standard, Bingham 
promised Truman, would allow him to demonstrate the 
administration's commitment to defending America.The 
president referred the matter to the Nimitz Commission. He 
then called upon Congress to increase the budgets of the FBI 
and the loyalty program.^® 
On April 11, the President gave an address on national 
television to explain his policy in Korea and his reasons 
for relieving General Douglas MacArthur of command in the 
Pacific.^'' Soon after. General MacArthur returned home a 
national hero. As Americans honored their removed warrior, 
their opinion of their head of state sank.^® Firing 
119 
MacArthur also hurt President Truman because the general, 
like the war he was fighting, was bound up in the issue of 
anti-communism. 
The irony of fate was quite painful. MacArthur had 
championed the cause of total victory over the communists, a 
strategy perfectly in line with the Republican right and 
also, it may have seemed to a bewildered public, a logical 
extension of the Truman Doctrine. Truman explained 
MacArthur's dismissal in terms of the president's 
constitutional obligation to remove field commanders who 
rejected his policy. The goal of restoring a "lasting 
peace" in Korea, he asserted, required the US to settle for 
reestablishing the 38th parallel.^® To bolster support for 
his war, the president repeated that the "communists in the 
Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out 
freedom around the world. It proved a tough sale, 
defining the war's objectives in limited terms while 
simultaneously casting the Cold War in apocalyptic language. 
Truman's critics interpreted the release of MacArthur 
as another example of Truman's irresolute commitment to the 
nation's security.®^ McCarthy accused Truman of making the 
decision while drunk and concluded "that son of a bitch 
should be impeached."®^ The allegations further isolated 
the president by diminishing his ability to reassure voters 
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of his sound judgement.®^ The jury in Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg's trial, meantime, recommended the death penalty. 
In the wake of the MacArthur bombshell and the other 
reverses for the administration, a majority in Congress 
refused to follow the president. On April 30, 1951, the 
Judiciary Committee rejected a bill that would have provided 
the Nimitz Commission with an exemption from a federal 
conflict of interest statute. The chairman of the judiciary 
committee. Senator Pat McCarran (D, Nevada), had been the 
successful sponsor of the Internal Security Act. McCarran 
felt no compulsion to cooperate with Truman. Without the 
exemption, which was normally a mere technicality, the 
PCISIR proposal was dead in the water. The Senate deferred 
to McCarran.®'' Internal security was now in the hands of 
Congress. 
Truman understood the rejection in terms of 
"McCarthyism." But the rise of Senator McCarran temporarily 
side-lined McCarthy as well. Though McCarran was a 
Democrat, the White House obviously did not fully appreciate 
the prevailing attitude in Congress toward more presidential 
initiatives. Truman grumbled that he needed to develop 
"some leverage" against Senator McCarran.®^ 
The Judiciary chairman's blockade encouraged the 
extreme anti-communists within the administration. During 
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its short period of operations, the Nimitz commission had 
taken as its first order of business an amendment to the 
government loyalty program's standard of dismissal. The 
panel never commented officially upon the amendment, but its 
interest lent credibility to those who supported a stricter 
definition of disloyalty. Having argued for a similar 
proposal since 1949, and now worried that the PCISIR might 
criticize their administration of the government's loyalty 
program, both the Loyalty Review Board and the Justice 
Department renewed their request for a standard of 
disloyalty freed from the restraints imposed by American 
jurisprudence.®® The Civil Service Commission and the State 
Department agreed, and suggested implementing the new 
standard even before the PCISIR began, citing "backlogs" in 
the program created by government employees who assumed a 
new standard would be implemented.®^ 
In late April, when it became clear that the PCISIR 
would be stillborn, Truman gave in. He wrote Nimitz to 
convey his understanding of Nimitz's reluctance to offer 
recommendations, given that the PCISIR had not been approved 
by Congress. But Truman, however, had decided not to 
wait.®® On April 28 he signed Executive Order 10241 
implementing a new loyalty standard. Henceforth, a 
government employee would be dismissed if "reasonable 
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grounds" existed for doubting his or her loyalty. First 
formulated in February, it had been drafted by McGrath.®® 
The new standard would soon have a profound effect on 
Truman's war against McCarthyism. 
Despite having preempted Nimitz by ordering the 
adoption of a new standard, Truman still wanted a report 
from the panel.During the spring and summer, he and his 
staff tried to break McCarran's strangle hold on the 
PCISIR.''^ Truman wrote a letter to McCarran which outlined 
why Congress should grant committee members legal 
exemptions. The letter was released to the public to 
expose McCarran's specious objections to the PCISIR (whose 
members were beginning to resign). More efforts to 
expose McCarran followed, but the Judiciary Chairman 
remained obdurate.''^ 
Clearly alarmed by the PCISIR's slow asphyxiation, 
Truman wrote Murphy that "the intention of the Nimitz 
Commission" had been to "stop the unAmerican activities of 
the loyalty boards. Despairing, the president gave the 
task of reviewing the "acute" problems of internal security 
program to the National Security Council."'® He expressed 
his concern that the lack of a uniform loyalty standard had, 
among other things, led to abuses of civil liberties. This 
concern had led him to ask the NSC for recommendations to 
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improve the standards and procedures of the program. The 
president neglected to explain the connection between his 
desire to restrict the loyalty boards and his approval of a 
plan to remove employees on the basis of remote 
possibilities. 
Concerned by the fact that other congressmen, 
particularly Pat McCarran, were generating the headlines, 
and facing the prospect of becoming redundant, McCarthy 
launched himself once again onto the front page in late June 
by accusing General George C. Marshall of involvement in an 
"immense communist conspiracy."^® The allegation, made 
against one of the nation's most trusted and respected 
public figures, nauseated congressmen on both sides of the 
isle."'® But there was little to do; the rules of the Senate 
prevented a libel suit. 
Outraged by the libel of someone he considered "the 
greatest living American," Truman made McCarthy's 
allegations against Marshall the centerpiece of his efforts 
to discredit his enemies.Truman warned citizens that the 
hysteria generated by politicians had taken root, often 
referring to a recent poll showing that most Americans would 
not endorse the principles embodied in the Declaration of 
Independence. At a major speech in late July, Truman damned 
those who use "the big lie for personal public and partisan 
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advantage, heedless of the damage they do to the country."®^ 
McCarthy demanded and received free air time to reply in 
kind. 
The administration countered with high-profile 
rhetorical contributions from, among others. Secretary of 
Labor Maurice J. Tobin and Conrad Snow, chairman of the 
State Department's LRB.®^ J. Howard McGrath made an effort 
to calm fears and increase support for the president.®^ 
Truman met with the leaders of the Wisconsin Democratic 
Party, mapping out the plan to defeat McCarthy in the 
election of 1952.®^ The administration's effort was matched 
to some extent by a few allies on the Hill, notably 
Senator's Kefauver, Lehman, and Benton.®® With a great deal 
of persistence and some luck. Senator Benton kept a Senate 
subcommittee's attention on investigating all the 
allegations about McCarthy, especially his role in 
Maryland's congressional election of 1950. White House 
staffers helped by providing information on McCarthy.®^ But 
Benton could not turn the attention of his peers away from 
anti-communism and toward McCarthy's unproven allegations. 
Frustration set in during the summer of 1951. George 
Elsey fumed at the waning vigor among members of the 
executive branch. The State Department's responses to 
McCarthy, he complained, arrived "too little too late."®® 
Next came White House Press Secretary Joseph Short, who had 
told the State Department to "lay off" responding to 
McCarthy. Elsey reminded his boss. Murphy, that a 
"forceful, direct rebuttal" to McCarthy and McCarthyism was 
the only way, that "the 'be quiet and he will go away' 
approach" had been tried and had failed.®^ 
Yet the White House's influence in Congress had waned 
to the point where, in late September, Truman's nomination 
of Philip Jessup as a delegate to the United Nations was 
held up by the baseless charges of the administration's 
opponents. McCarthy was the first to testify at Jessup's 
confirmation hearings, repeating allegations so dated that 
the State Department had issued a full rebuttal months 
before. Fully appraised, the Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, William J. Fulbright, made 
McCarthy look foolish. Enough opposition to Jessup 
remained, however, for the Senate subcommittee handling the 
matter to vote 3-2 against recommending his nomination.®^ 
Democrats in Congress held over the nomination. Privately, 
friends on the Hill cautioned the president against picking 
a fight with Congress over Jessup's confirmation.®^ 
Truman was in no mood for compromise. Concerned that 
congressional investigations were releasing far too m.uch 
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classified material, Truman extended the scope of the 
government's security classification, thereby decreasing the 
amount of information released by the executive branch." 
The extended classification forced the White House into the 
position of denying "that this decision would result in 
censorship, the concealing of mistakes, or the denial of 
legitimate information to the public."®" Its attempt to 
"protect the nation" placed the administration in the 
unenviable position of disparaging McCarthy's defense of 
freedom of information as irresponsible.®^ 
By October, the White House knew the Jessup nomination 
had become mired in the anti-communist controversy and 
therefore faced defeat without a "drastic stroke, such as 
Eisenhower or H. Hoover supporting Jessup [sic]."®® Truman, 
however, could not accept the loss of a gifted public 
servant because of "charges bordering on fraud."®'' When 
Congress recessed, Truman gave Jessup an interim 
appointment. Neither the installation of Jessup nor the 
extension of security classification improved Truman's 
popularity.®® Moreover, these actions were hardly designed 
to foster a spirit of bipartisanship. The president 
justified his actions on the grounds that McCarthyism, like 
"Hitlerism," was a "form of bacteriological warfare against 
the minds and souls of men."®® 
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The PCISIR, however, could not be established by-
executive fiat, though as late as October 1, Truman asked 
Nimitz to produce a report by January of 1952.^°° In a 
detailed memorandum a few days later, George Elsey counseled 
the president to discontinue efforts to establish the 
presidential commission. Elsey advised that Nimitz and 
the others, most of whom had already made the request, 
should be allowed to resign. The resignations should be 
delayed, however, until the president named Seth Richardson 
as his Special Assistant on Loyalty and Security Matters. 
The recommendations by the NSC, a subcommittee of which was 
currently conducting a review of loyalty policy, would be 
given to Special Assistant Richardson. Admiral Nimitz 
agreed with Elsey's plan, but with a interesting twist. 
In tendering his resignation, Nimitz told Truman that 
there was "considerably less need for an inquiry of this 
sort," in part because the commission was sure to become 
embroiled in partisanship as the elections approached. 
But Nimitz also pointed out that there was little to be done 
given that the new loyalty standard had been implemented, 
the problem had been given to the NSC, and the 
administration had continued its prosecution of communist 
party leaders. In listing all the administration's 
initiatives, Nimitz seemed to ask 'What could the PCISIR do 
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that has not been done?' The commission had been preempted 
by its creator. In his scramble to gild his reputation, 
Truman had emptied the PCISIR of content, making it 
impossible to justify its existence. The president accepted 
the resignations of the members of the Nimitz Commission on 
October 26, 1951, six months after they had been tendered.^"'' 
Pointing an angry finger at the entire Congress, the 
president expressed his disappointment at its unwillingness 
to do what he considered right. Truman "had hoped," he 
wrote to Nimitz, "that the Congress would be so anxious as I 
am to make sure that the Bill of Rights is not undermined in 
our eagerness to stamp out subversive activities" by "making 
a non-partisan and honest study of the government's loyalty 
and security program. 
Thus, with an election year just around the corner, the 
president had to give up his attempt to have a distinguished 
group of Americans certify that the president had pursued a 
rational, effective anti-communist program. Unilateral 
executive action, in particular the Korean war and the 
PCISIR, had failed to redeem his tarnished image. Executive 
actions also precluded the kind of concessions that the 
president would have had to have made in order to isolate 
McCarthy from Congress. Truman blamed his problems, as well 
as the nation's ills, first on McCarthy, then the 
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McCarthyites, then the Republicans, and then Congress. By 
damning his critics for unleashing the pervasive hysteria, 
the president had increased the public's perception of his 
impotence. Having become an "ism," McCarthy's name appeared 
everywhere. 
In a desperate attempt to construct a base from which 
to challenge McCarthy directly, Truman had strengthened the 
standard of disloyalty under which the government's security 
program operated. It was strange that the president could 
still hope to restore his reputation by endorsing extreme 
anti-communism. For the past two years, McCarthy had used 
extreme anti-communism to denigrate presidential leadership. 
At least one of the administrative assistants, Donald 
Dawson, doubted that Truman would receive credit should the 
new standard enable the LRB to find more disloyal employees 
within the government.^®® Dawson recognized that the new 
standard contradicted two years of assertions that no 
loyalty reforms were needed and that the program could not 
be strengthened without jeopardizing civil liberties. If 
Dawson also recognized that Executive Order 10241 was an 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Hypocrisy 
1952 proved a most difficult year for Truman. He began 
the year with an unusually low public approval rating. The 
latter half of 1951 had not brought victory in Korea, but 
another round of administration employees being released by 
the loyalty boards. The stalemate in Korea and the release 
of more employees highlighted the contradiction between the 
theory and the practice of Truman's anti-communism. The 
election year had barely begun when Truman's staff told him 
that he had, for the time being, no chance of defeating the 
McCarthyites. His aides also informed him that his domestic 
program against communism had damaged the lives of many 
innocent government employees. Angry and frustrated, Truman 
campaigned against McCarthyism in a manner that nearly 
matched McCarthy in hypocrisy and self-serving partisanship. 
The final destruction of Truman's political position 
began with the implementation of the Executive Order 10241. 
The new standard authorized the release of any employee 
about whom reasonable doubt existed as to his or her 
loyalty. Directing its implementation, LRB Chairman Hiriam 
Bingham instructed the agency review boards to reevaluate 
all previous cases in which employees had been cleared on 
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appeal.^ During the fall of 1951, board members wielded 
that power with zeal. The new standard generated a wave of 
press coverage about hearings, perjury, and resignations.^ 
The most important of those cases ended in December of 
1951. John Stuart Service, a foreign service officer with 
the state department, had been one of McCarthy's favorite 
targets during the previous two years. Questions about 
Service had first arisen in 1945. He had been suspended by 
Richardson, then reinstated by Acheson. Since then. Service 
had endured five more investigations, but had been cleared 
as recently as July, 1951.^ The new loyalty standard, 
however, sealed his fate. 
In December, Acheson approved Bingham's request that 
Service be retired prematurely from the Foreign Service. 
Appearing alongside the cases of Ester Brunauer, William 
Remington and others, the dismissal of Service vindicated 
McCarthy, provided legitimacy for congressional 
investigations, and further weakened the administration's— 
especially Dean Acheson's—credibility. The situation 
spurred the Secretary of State, ever the reluctant 
politician, into a bold move. In early January, 1952, the 
State Department released a letter from the Secretary of 
State to the President.'' In it, Acheson placed the review 
board's irrational zealotry into stark relief. 
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Acheson expressed his confusion and alarm at the 
Loyalty Review Board's recommendation of the release of John 
C. Vincent, another well-known state department officer. 
Chairman Bingham had informed Acheson that the board's 
recommendation had been reached "without accepting or 
rejecting" either the testimony of Louis Budenz or the 
findings of prior investigations. Bingham had added that 
while he had neither "accepted or rejected these factors, 
[he had] taken them into account." Acheson was "unable to 
determine" what Bingham meant by this.^ 
Acheson also condemned those who labeled the critics of 
anti-communist policies as communist sympathizers. Vouching 
for John Vincent's character, he defended the right to 
criticize United State policy. Foreign Service Officers had 
to be allowed to assess the situation as they saw fit, he 
contended, for the good of the country, if nothing else. 
While Acheson had the authority to reject Bingham's 
recommendation, he declined to do so. Instead, he asked the 
president for permission to appoint a respected judge to 
examine the evidence. The president agreed.® John Vincent 
was eventually cleared, only to be suspended a year later by 
the Eisenhower administration. 
Judging by the angry public reaction Acheson's 
statement generated, it was a little late for him to defend 
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the administration's position by defending the principle of 
honest criticism.^ He had, however, publicly rebuked the 
officers of Truman's own program in terms heretofore 
reserved for congressmen. Acheson had, in essence, 
abandoned hope that the Truman Administration could restore 
its reputation by praising the stringency of its program. 
In so doing, he had stood up for the rights of the accused. 
However ineffective, it was an honorable position. What he 
could not do, of course, was criticize Truman's new loyalty 
standard. The new standard certainly muddled the clarity of 
Acheson's position, as the State Department took the 
posirion that the LRB had not found Vincent guilty of 
disloyalty; the board had found reasonable doubt.® 
Acheson was not alone in his disgust with officials of 
the loyalty program. Within a few days of his letter, the 
president received a similar evaluation from his domestic 
policy staff. Following the acceptance of George Elsey's 
request for reassignment, the task of developing a response 
to domestic political problems had fallen to Donald Hansen, 
Richard Neustadt and James Loeb.® The three administrative 
assistants collaborated on a scathing critique. Angered by 
the attacks on Service and Vincent, they accused the LRB 
officials and the Attorney General of betrayal. 
In their private memorandum, Hansen and the others 
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attributed the new standard to the insistence of all the 
other executive branch bodies concerned, beginning with the 
commission that had created the loyalty program back in 1948 
and stretching through the Nimitz commission. Truman had 
adopted the standard because the FBI, the Attorney General, 
the LRB, the Nimitz Commission, and even the Civil Service 
Commission had complained that lack of a clear standard had 
created "confusion" and "backlogs" in the system. Before 
adopting it, however, the White House had sent the matter to 
the Justice Department for an evaluation of the proposal's 
impact on civil liberties. The Attorney General had replied 
that the new standard would not effect the cases of the 
Justice Department loyalty board, and recommended passage. 
The President, according to his staff, had acted in 
good faith. They contended, however, that "the Loyalty 
Review Board, its staff, and the lower loyalty boards have 
little idea of what 'reasonable doubt' means as a 
standard.Angry at the board for violating the spirit 
of the new standard, the staff was also outraged by the 
duplicity of J. Howard McGrath. The Attorney General had 
seen to it that the "first cases reopened by the [Justice] 
department under the new standard were the McCarthy cases." 
McGrath clearly had violated the letter of the 
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president's request. At this stage of the game, however, 
the staff had little reason to be shocked. The Attorney 
General had rarely missed an opportunity to enhance his 
image as a vigorous anti-communist, and had resisted White 
House efforts to reign him in during the debate leading up 
to the McCarran Act.Hansen did not, however, record just 
what the president had hoped to be accomplished by setting 
the standard at reasonable doubt, other than to produce more 
dismissals. Like McGrath, Hoover and Bingham had long 
records of anti-communist zealotry. Blaming the 
administrators of the government's security apparatus, 
however, suited Murphy and his staff. Although they agreed 
with Acheson's condemnation of Bingham, McGrath and Hoover, 
the White House did not agree with the Secretary of State's 
strategy. When Hansen wrote that "foes of Senator McCarthy 
have real cause for alarm" in light of the Service case and 
others, he was referring to the adverse political 
implications.^^ Even though he and the other members of the 
staff considered the loyalty program "a monster," the staff 
conceded that "they had the tiger by the tail and there 
wasn't much they could do about it."^® 
"As to the loyalty program," the administrative 
assistants advised Truman "quite coldly that no White House 
action should be taken pending any developments which would 
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make such action... desirable, and timely from a public 
relations standpoint."^'' The staff rejected the 
establishment of a commission to study the standard because 
it "may be interpreted in many quarters as indicative of 
administration vacillation, confusion, and indecision." The 
staff also advised the president not to revoke it 
unilaterally. In the wake of the John Service case, 
"[revocation] would be interpreted most unfavorably." The 
president could also expect the officials of the loyalty 
program to oppose amending the oath. The men he had 
appointed to run the loyalty program, Truman had just been 
told, believed the nature of the times necessitated the 
strongest measures. Truman's aides quite obviously did not 
share this belief. 
The assessment of both the White House staff and the 
Secretary of State conveyed a sense of having been 
victimized by an overwrought loyalty program, a hysterical 
public, and an evil opponent. These forces had caused the 
degeneration of the president's loyalty and security policy 
into a hopeless mess, one which simultaneously infringed 
upon the civil liberties of government employees while 
marring his personal credibility. Having been told that he 
had no other options, Truman decided not to repudiate 
McGrath, Bingham, or Hoover. 
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Truman squared his shoulders and went on. In his State 
of the Union Address delivered in January of 1952, the 
President made it perfectly clear that his primary concern 
was preserving the national commitment to the war in Korea 
and the principles of the Truman Doctrine. He drew the 
conflict between East and West in apocalyptic terms. The 
United States, which had had "one Pearl Harbor," had to gird 
itself for "saving the basic moral and spiritual values of 
our civilization" from the world wide communist movement.^® 
Truman must have known that he did not need to sell 
Americans on the Cold War. The president invoked the image 
of Pearl Harbor because he wanted to rebuild his credibility 
by separating his foreign policy, for which there was public 
support, from his domestic anti-communism, which was held in 
such contempt. To highlight his aggressive foreign policy 
in the face of Republican isolationism, then, Truman began 
the election year as many others did, identifying grave 
threats to the Republic. 
McCarthy, who excelled at identifying enemies, must 
have relished the election. Bearing no responsibility for 
the nation's anti-communism either at home or abroad, 
Truman's chief critic had little problem in taking a more 
extreme position than the president. McCarthy's campaign 
exemplified the fact that those out of power can always be 
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more radical than those confined by responsibility. As 
usual, he went out of his way to tweak Truman's nose 
directly and personally.^® Such was the situation in 
February of 1952 that the Senator could openly dismiss the 
President as "a puppet on the strings being pulled by the 
Achesons, [and the] Lattimores.McCarthy even called the 
State Department's LRB Chairman, Conrad Snow, a "befuddled 
old fool who doesn't know enough to come in out of the 
rain. "21 
The worst part of McCarthy's rhetoric, in terms of 
Truman's political future, was that so many others echoed 
it. With an election approaching and the powerful issue of 
anti-communism within easy reach. Congress contained many 
critics of Truman's anti-communist record. The White House 
could only look on and despair as Congress pushed forward 
with a huge number of investigations in 1952. 
Investigating subcommittees in both chambers of Congress 
searched for communists in schools, unions, and the United 
Nations. All of these Congressional investigations further 
diminished the administration's political position because 
Truman had labeled all congressional involvement in anti-
communism as McCarthyism. The White House well knew that 
these investigations would focus on the administration's 
"failures" in stopping the communists.More congressional 
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investigations also meant more congressional requests for 
files, which again put the White House on the defensive. It 
had little choice but to condemn congressional requests for 
files as "irresponsible."^^ Truman proclaimed it his 
"solemn duty to resist demands for fishing expeditions into 
his private files."-- He tried to keep the loyalty files, 
especially the State Department Loyalty files, out of the 
hands of congressional committees.^® He again cast doubt on 
the veracity of the testimony contained in those files. 
But in the wake of the new standard of disloyalty, Truman's 
defiance could be as easily attributed to fear as to 
principle. 
The administration's last hope for a congressional 
censure of McCarthy, the Senate's investigation of 
McCarthy's role in the congressional elections of 1950 
chaired by Senator Gillette, had faded considerably in the 
past few months. By mid-February, the White House staff had 
realized that, aided by the uneasy silence of his peers and 
the raucous support of his fans, McCarthy had succeeded yet 
again in characterizing the investigation as a partisan 
attack upon him.^® 
With little reason to hope for improvement in the 
battlefields of Korea or Congress, the president knew his 
time was up. In early March, he announced that he would 
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step down at the end of his term. Later, Truman claimed 
that he had made the decision not to run months before this 
point, that he had served his country enough.^® His 
decision, however, followed a second-place finish to Senator 
Estes Kefauver in the New Hampshire Democratic primary, a 
death knell to an incumbent president. Even if he had made 
the decision earlier, waiting until after the primary to 
announce his decision called into question his motive. 
Irrespective of his own candidacy, however, Truman 
considered the upcoming election as a referendum on his 
tenure and beliefs. Having withdrawn from the race, the 
president intended to win in the court of public opinion. A 
large part of his campaign for vindication involved 
denouncing McCarthyism. For his part, McCarthy emphasized 
his recent successes and therefore ran against Truman. 
Truman's staff had prepared an analysis of the role of 
both McCarthy and McCarthyism upon the presidential election 
of 1952 a full year in advance, in February 1951. The 
memorandum was entitled "Meeting the Challenges of 
McCarthyism.Devoted entirely to the individual (not the 
ism), the memo resembled the energetic 'get-McCarthy' plan 
that Truman had piously rejected in June of 1950. Getting 
McCarthy was "not just a matter of framing the argument 
correctly," but of exposing and disgracing Joe McCarthy. 
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The disgrace of McCarthy, Truman and his staff believed, 
would bring triumph over the forces of McCarthyism. While 
the memo cautioned that a concerted assault on an individual 
senator, if mishandled, might "make a martyr of the object," 
it neglected to mention the means by which he would be 
exposed. 
Over a year later, the staff was still searching for 
an effective method of convincing voters of Joe McCarthy's 
deceit. In April of 1952, Donald Hansen and Martin J. 
Friedman drafted two replies to some of McCarthy's 
statements and sent them along with a cover letter to 
Special Council Murphy. Both drafts denounced the man as a 
liar "motivated by political and personal malice," whose 
patriotism was as dangerous as it was phony.Hansen's 
suggestions, however, proceeded "on the theory that each of 
Senator's McCarthy's tharges should be cited and 
demolished." Friedman, on the other hand, denied the need 
for defense against specific charges, but focused on the 
senator's "dishonest and slanted technique." Hansen 
objected to his colleague's approach, for it amounted to 
"little more than name calling and does not effectively 
rebut McCarthy." Friedman liked Hansen's ideas, but 
recommended his own, because the first draft carried "with 
it the risk of inviting a hearing, which in view of the 
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current composition of the [Gillette] subcommittee might 
well turn into a smear-fest." 
Though it had long held doubts about the Gillette 
subcommittee's future, the White House also knew that it 
contained Congress's most vociferous anti-McCarthyite, 
Senator Benton. As advised by Murphy, Truman met with 
congressional leaders in May to voice his concern "that the 
[Gillette] subcommittee is being urged to choke off further 
investigation into McCarthy's financial situation. 
Truman urged the subcommittee to keep going because its 
investigation into McCarthy's financial dealings with the 
Lustron Company, had "been widely published and are having 
good effect.Truman's assistants dug into McCarthy's 
past and passed the product on to their allies in 
Congress.Ken Hechler found out that the injury McCarthy 
claimed was a "war wound" from a "strafing mission" had 
resulted from "a unit initiation right.But the effort 
to build the subcommittee into an effective instrument 
failed. Its effort to investigate McCarthy was dismissed by 
the Republicans as a predictable election tactic.^"' The 
Gillette subcommittee lurched into the summer of 1952, then 
disintegrated entirely in the autumn. 
The lack of congressional cooperation stemmed in part 
from Truman's lack of success in Korea. While trying to 
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encourage the Benton subcommittee, Truman also demanded that 
Congress finance his interventionist foreign policy and 
extend the War Powers Act, which enlarged the president's 
authority.^® "To win the Cold War," he asserted, "Congress 
must give what we ask."^® 
Without allies in Congress willing to help him destroy 
McCarthy and having decided against more unilateral action, 
Truman set out on the campaign trail to present the public 
with a clear choice. He campaigned hard. His high 
profile made others within his Party nervous, though many 
agreed with his position."Mystified" by Adlai 
Stevenson's desire to distance himself from "the president 
he hoped to succeed," Truman got on the stump and expressed 
himself with great passion. 
He liked to begin his stump speeches with the positive 
results of the Roosevelt-Truman years. He declared that his 
policies had "given every man better opportunities."''^ He 
enjoyed blaming the Republicans for the Great Depression and 
"celebrating the advances for working people" since then." 
He warned the public that the Republicans would wipe out 
these advances.''^ As far as he was concerned, Truman owned 
the issue of domestic economics. But then he had to turn to 
the issues that plagued him. 
As usual, Truman framed the issue of anti-communism in 
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terms of foreign policy.^® His feverish rhetoric about the 
fight against worldwide communisin, his strongest suit, never 
slackened. "The world had learned the lessons of 
Czechoslovakia," he declared, "that communism means 
conquest, oppression, and slavery."" It was the only 
position for him to take, given that he had committed U.S. 
forces in Korea. But Truman had other reasons for asserting 
that "the very existence of the country is at stake" in 
Korea.'*® He believed that his strong stand in Korea 
answered those who claimed he was soft on communism.^® 
For Republicans to brand him soft on communism, Truman 
concluded, was "what we might call the 'white is black' 
strategy. He had, he asserted, the most impressive anti-
communist record. He ran down the long list of his 
initiatives against communism then took a moment to locate 
the spots on his opponents' record: "Ask them how they voted 
on the Marshall plan."^^ The president's anti-communism, 
retorted Republicans, had produced only bloody stalemate. 
It irritated the president no end that the Republicans were 
free to attack the war in Korea from both sides. While 
conservatives and McCarthyites argued for the expansion of 
the conflict into China and the use of nuclear weapons, 
others advocated abandoning the war. Not content just to 
explain why both side were wrong, Truman predicted that "if 
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war comes [to the United States]... these loud talkers would 
be the first to run for the bomb shelters.After calling 
them cowards, he impugned their patriotism. 
As he had stated several times over the past two years, 
Truman maintained that the issues of national security "are 
not—and must not become—questions of party politics. 
In other words, the principles at stake in Korea were 
inviolate. Americans had a patriotic duty to support the 
war in order to end it quickly and successfully.^® The 
Republicans' "campaign of phony propaganda" weakened the war 
effort; their campaign therefore amounted to partisanship at 
the expense of national security.^'' This line of reasoning 
had little chance of damaging the Republicans, however. 
Korea had long since become a political issue, in large part 
because Truman had assumed full responsibility for it. So 
he tried another tack. He accused the Republicans of being 
all the more insidious because they were isolationists who 
would scrap the Truman Doctrine upon election.^® 
Isolationism, Truman contended, would lead to a Third World 
War.^® Whether or not he actually convinced anyone that the 
Republicans would retreat in Korea, the fact remained that 
the meat of the conflict between Truman and the McCarthyites 
was domestic communism. And his apocalyptic rhetoric about 
the global Cold War contradicted the president's contention 
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that the McCarthyites had overblown the issue of internal 
security. 
In the final months of the campaign, Truman could not 
discuss the Republicans' position on internal security 
without becoming bitter. He excoriated the GOP for 
sanctioning the use of the "technique of the big lie."®° A 
technique that had been "developed by the communists and 
perfected by Hitler." The big lie consisted of two parts. 
First, its practitioners made an assertion about their 
opponent "which is frightening and horrible and so extreme 
that nobody could believe that a decent person would make it 
if it were not true." Then they repeated it over and over, 
"ignoring all proof to the contrary."®^ The big lie portion 
of his stump speeches was Truman's response to McCarthy's 
charge that his administration was shot through with 
communists. Devoid of references to the touchstones of 
McCarthyism (Hiss, China, the Rosenbergs, Service), Truman's 
diatribes failed to cover the entire domestic political 
landscape. 
The campaign diatribes also included a section on the 
Republican presidential nominee. Truman and his staff 
agreed that McCarthy's dishonesty made General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower vulnerable.®^ Truman blasted Eisenhower for 
being "a prisoner of the isolationist Republicans."®^ The 
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president considered the Eisenhower-McCarthy handshake a 
seminal event, one which embodied all that the Republicans 
had become. He believed that Eisenhower had condoned 
McCarthy's vilification of George C. Marshall and that, as 
Murphy later recounted, "made Truman as mad as anything I 
know [,] ever. One of the most respected figures of the 
era, Marshall had also been Ike's "great benefactor."®^ 
Time and again, Truman tarred Ike with Joe.®® 
For contrast, the president maintained that his Party's 
commitment to honest politics and civil liberties made it 
far superior to its opponent. He implicated McCarthy in the 
illegal and unethical shenanigans of Maryland's 
congressional elections two years before. ®'' The White House 
had long considered McCarthy's role in the defeat of Senator 
Tydings a good issue.®® Truman challenged the voters of 
both Maryland and Wisconsin to elect better senators. He 
issued the latter challenge in Milwaukee, as the president 
cranked up his Party's machinery in the enemy's own 
backyard. 
Truman's final charge against McCarthyism was that it 
represented "a determined effort to snuff out the Bill of 
Rights.His opponents confused "innocent persons with 
communists," and were therefore responsible for injustice as 
well for "muddying the waters and making the real communists 
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harder to detect.""'^ It was vital that Americans stand up 
for civil liberties.''^ Underscoring the point, Truman 
reminded voters that he had vetoed a congressional 
immigration initiative that went too far." 
The veto, however, was an isolated occurrence. The 
xAttorney General continued to violate constitutional 
guarantees of due process by adding more names to the list 
of subversive organizations. Just months before the 
election, the Justice Department also renewed its 
prosecution of the leadership of the American Communist 
Party.Truman bragged about his commitment to the 
prosecutions, unaware that his comments attested to the 
similarity between himself and McCarthy."'^ Then Truman gave 
his loyalty program one last bit of direction. 
When he established the new loyalty standard in early 
1951, the president had asked the Civil Service Committee to 
report to him on internal security. The CSC finally 
presented its report in the summer of 1952. It recommended 
enlarging the scope of the LRB, which would henceforth 
investigate all employees, not just those in sensitive 
agencies; this became the order of the day.''® The other, 
structural, recommendations languished for four months 
before receiving presidential approval."'^ Years later, 
Truman cited the reorganization as an example of his 
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commitment to "protecting the good name of applicants and 
employees."''® But the CSC' s report had not addressed the 
problem of defining disloyalty. It had extended the reach 
of the LRB. Given that some White House staff members 
considered the loyalty program a monster, Truman's 
characterization of the reorganization was obviously 
disingenuous. 
The sins of omission were just as bad. During the 
election, Truman, Murphy and Hansen deliberately ignored 
the severe problems in the loyalty program which they had 
acknowledged in January. On two occasions, the president 
praised his loyalty program and the FBI for being firm 
barriers against sabotage."'® The administration provided 
the press with statistics documenting the stringency of the 
loyalty program.®® Aside from Acheson's lone outburst 
against Bingham, the disgust of some of Truman's staff at 
the loyalty program never found a public voice. But then, 
the president's confusion ran deep. When Seth Richardson, 
former head of the LRB and a sponsor of the new loyalty 
standard, wrote to thank Truman for "affording me 
opportunities to engage in important non-partisan public 
service, free from any suggestion of political motive," 
Truman responded with warm praise.®^ 
McCarthy thoroughly enjoyed the election, striking a 
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high profile, confident that leaders of the Republican Party 
would attribute a share of the party's success to him. His 
easy victory in the Wisconsin primary assured this result.®^ 
While polishing his image, the early victory also allowed 
him to campaign more toward the national audience than the 
citizens of VJisconsin. Always eager to challenge his 
critics, he adopted the campaign slogan "America loves him 
for the enemies he's made."®^ Some of the juicy material 
for his speeches came from, at one time or another, members 
of the Justice Department, the FBI, and even the Loyalty 
Review Board.Failing this, McCarthy resorted to outright 
fabrication. 
In October, McCarthy gave a speech on television, 
holding in his hand "photostatic copies of the Daily 
Worker."®® The Senator claimed that the Communist Party had 
endorsed Stevenson as the lesser of two evils, although this 
was untrue. He often referred to the Democratic candidate 
as "Alger Stevenson," pretending to have confused 
Stevenson's first name with that of Alger Hiss, a man 
convicted of perjury but reviled as a communist spy. Even 
years later, former White House staff members could still 
hear McCarthy saying "Oh, pardon me, Adlai..."®'' Whether or 
not the Senator's bombshells, delivered in a soft monotone, 
were of great influence in the solid Republican victory of 
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1952, Truman thought so. He complained to his staff that 
they had been defeated by "bald demagoguery. 
Truman had campaigned as a personal vendetta against 
Joe McCarthy, McCarthyism, and the Republican Party. He 
counted his enemies' victory as "one of the great tragedies 
of our time" because he considered the issue of anti-
communism as the central issue.®® He faulted Stevenson for 
not hitting McCarthy hard enough.®® He never forgave 
Eisenhower for failing, in the president's estimation, to 
condemn McCarthy.®^ The fact that Truman was less angry at 
Senator Pat McCarran than at McCarthy marked Truman's 
fixation on Republicans—not the Democratic majority in 
Congress—as the source of his troubles.®^ The passage of 
time did not dim Truman's anger at their criminal abuse of 
power. In his autobiography years later, Truman vented his 
disgust over and over again at the McCarthyites for 
"engaging in narrow partisan appeals and [for] preying upon 
the false hopes of a nation in crisis."®^ 
Truman lived to see McCarthy's fall into disgrace, but 
it took awhile. The 83rd Congress (1953-54) held a record 
high fifty-one investigations into communism.®^ After the 
election. President Eisenhower's Attorney General, Herbert 
Brownell, subpoenaed Truman to testify at a hearing into 
loyalty policy. Truman cited executive privilege and 
refused the summons. J, Edgar Hoover, who had done so much 
to aid the Senator during Truman's tenure and remained a 
close friend of Mr. and Mrs. Joe McCarthy, was quite willing 
to condemn Truman before the new Attorney General.®^ Unlike 
his friend from Wisconsin, Hoover remained at the center of 
American politics for many years. Joe McCarthy rode the 
wave of anti-communism, in his unusually reckless way, until 
his charges against the US Army two years later led to his 
condemnation by the Senate. But the future held more for 
Truman than the demise of McCarthy. He lived long enough to 
see the Truman Doctrine take its place alongside Franklin 
Roosevelt's New Deal as the foundation of the next several 
administrations. Republican and Democrat alike. He had left 
a legacy of ideas, but not of leadership. 
What the passage of time never brought was an admission 
from the president of some responsibility for the ravages of 
McCarthyism. He realized, he said, that "if I had yielded 
to the clamor by agreeing to a reckless dismissal of the 
people under fire, I could have silenced many critics."®® 
But, Truman maintained, he had been guided by principle.®'^ 
He offered no comment on the fact that Bingham and McGrath 
operated upon his principles. Years later, he claimed that 
he never understood why, "when the government expels a few 
of its undesirable employees, it should...in all decency be 
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used to agitate doubts about all the people in 
government."®® He attributed the ephemeral victory of 
McCarthyism to the cycles of hysteria in America.®® 
Yet Truman had spent his last year in office re-
enforcing the contradictions within his position. While 
deriding his opponents for blowing the issue out of 
proportion, he had spoken of another Pearl Harbor and had 
strengthened the loyalty standard. He had praised a program 
that he knew to be inimical to civil liberties. During the 
final months, he had increased the scope of the program. In 
sum, he had lost control of the Cold War consensus because 
he was a McCarthyite who opposed McCarthyism. His 
credibility had disintegrated under the weight of the 
contradiction. Without a frank recognition of his 
culpability, Truman also never had the honor due those who 
admit their mistakes. 
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Truman blamed his defeat on McCarthyism, which he 
defined as a mixture of national hysteria and evil 
partisanship. To some extent, he was right. Joe McCarthy 
demonstrated a unique talent for exploiting the public's 
fear of communism-. But McCarthy only used anti-comjnunism.,-
he had not created it. And McCarthy's use of the issue, as 
an indictment of the administration, was successful mostly 
because of the response he elicited from Truman. 
Truman had good reason for condemning McCarthy without 
condemning extreme anti-communism. He believed that 
McCarthy was vulnerable. More important, Truman believed 
that taking a hardline stand against communists had helped 
his career and would do so again. But most of all, he 
championed the tenets of extreme anti-communism because he 
believed that America's survival depended upon defeating 
communists at home and abroad. Truman's problems sprang 
then, at least in part, from his own Cold War demagoguery, 
which left him little theoretical room within which to 
condemn McCarthy. 
The lack of an ethical—or a clear—distinction between 
McCarthy and Truman, however, was not the sole instrument by 
which McCarthy transformed anti-communism into a damning 
indictment of the administration. Truman's problems were 
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also a function of his refusal to understand McCarthy in 
terms of normal political dynamics. According to the 
president, McCarthy had lied, and his lie obviated the 
policy debate between Republican and Democrat, between 
President and Congress, that normally accompanied powerful 
issues like national security. But in the wake of events 
like the conviction of Alger Hiss and the war in Korea, the 
Cold War became much too compelling an issue to expect so 
many politicians not to burnish their anti-communist 
credentials. Tactically, the president needed to start 
acting "presidential," by allowing Congress to share some of 
the glory (and to shoulder some of the responsibility) for 
the Cold War. Truman chose instead to extrapolate his 
battle with McCarthy into a war against all critics. Thus 
was "McCarthyism," and its victory, mostly Truman's own 
fault. 
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